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Abstract
In many countries, different degrees of banking instability occurred following a 
complete financial deregulation, although the reasons for the instability varied. It was 
widely recognised that macroeconomic instability was responsible for the failure of 
financial deregulation in several countries. Another important reason for banking 
instability was the moral hazard problem that emerged after financial deregulation. Under 
central bank guarantees of bank deposits, the complete removal of traditional regulations 
led banks to take on excessive risk. Several other reasons for the banking failure such as 
inappropriate sequencing of economic reform and inadequate supervision of banks were 
identified.
Responding to concerns about banking instability, this thesis examines the 
positive and negative effects of financial deregulation on the development of banking in 
Indonesia. The Indonesian experience is a classic example of the trade-off between 
financial deepening and banking instability under financial deregulation with central bank 
guarantees and without adequate supervision of banks. The presence of externalities 
associated with the use of money on the one hand, and systemic risk such as the risk of a 
run on the payments system on the other, makes free market competition in banking, 
without central bank intervention, not feasible.
This thesis, therefore, models the relationship between the central bank and 
commercial banks in the context of a loan insurance scheme. The model extends the 
literature on optimal risk-sharing contracts to the banking sector. In so doing, different 
utility functions, which are more representative of the banks' utility functions, are 
introduced. The model aims at allowing the central bank to eliminate the moral hazard 
problem in bank lending and at the same time give assurance or confidence to depositors. 
As the model is a theoretical exposition of the relationship between a central bank and 
commercial banks, it stops short of providing a 'blueprint' for such an optimal risk­
sharing contract. To achieve this, simulations of the theoretical model will need to be 
done, and this is the subject of further work in the future.
The loan insurance scheme envisages that the bank pays an insurance premium to 
the central bank that varies proportionately with the expected size of the default loans. 
When there is a default, the central bank will pay an amount to the bank equal to the size 
of the default. The model finds that in the presence of the moral hazard problem, the 
optimal contract allows the commercial bank to reap marginal benefit from efforts 
towards prudent lending, reflected in the decreased losses to the bank. This will induce 
the bank to increase its efforts towards prudent lending, hence eliminating the incentives 
to shirk. The optimal contract thus requires the commercial bank to bear some of the 
lending risk by sharing the loss increase.
Loan insurance can clearly eliminate the moral hazard problem in banking. It 
cannot, however, fully prevent bank bankruptcies. This is so because bank bankruptcies 
can occur for other reasons, such as lack of skilled labour and weak management of risk. 
For this reason, effective regulation and supervision of banks becomes very necessary, 
primarily to ensure that an efficient and sound payments system can be sustained. In this 
case, banking regulation can be seen as a minimum requirement for achieving the 
soundness of banks joining the insurance scheme.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Over the past two decades many countries, both developed and developing, have 
adopted financial deregulation. This was motivated by the realisation that financial 
liberalisation, as opposed to financial repression, allows savings to be effectively 
mobilised and financial resources to be efficiently allocated, and hence is growth 
promoting.1 Direct government intervention into the banking sector results in financial 
repression associated with large efficiency costs. Reductions in international bank lending 
in the 1980s forced borrower countries to release more domestic resources for 
investment and growth. In response to such a realisation, the Indonesian government 
initiated financial deregulation in 1983. Ceilings on credits and interest rates were 
eliminated, restrictions on market entry and operations of banks were removed, and 
reserve requirements were lowered. The government also introduced measures of 
banking supervision such as lending limits and capital adequacy requirements.2
The deregulation brought about dramatic changes in the financial sector, 
especially banking. The number of banks and their branches more than doubled within 
only 18 months from October 1988 when the restrictions on opening new banks and 
bank branches were removed. The total assets of deposit money banks grew by more 
than 31 per cent annually from 1982 to 1993. The average value of loans outstanding 
surged by 23 per cent annually during the same period. Domestic interest rates rose 
sharply from 1984, well above those of international money markets. It should be noted 
that Indonesia experienced negative real interest rates before undertaking financial 
deregulation.
Although there were significant benefits from banking deregulation for both the 
banking sector and the community (especially the previously neglected small businesses 
and individuals with low asset base), the extremely rapid expansion of banking could lead
'The details of the theoretical background are presented in Chapter 4.
2For further details, see Chapter 3.
to inefficiencies and the possibilities of financial bubbles. The evidence shows that a 
number of countries experienced financial crisis following a financial liberalisation. These 
included Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay in the 1970s. Several developed countries such 
as the United States and Australia in the 1980s, and Japan in the early 1990s, also 
experienced financial 'bubbles'.
The very rapid expansion of Indonesian banking, together with a number of 
factors such as poor management and lack of experienced staff, led to several banking 
failures at the beginning of the 1990s. The total of non-performing loans (loans on which 
no interest has been paid for three months or more) mounted both in private and state 
banks. Indonesia also experienced relatively high positive real interest rates (positive by 
three or more percentage points greater than zero) compared to countries such as 
Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. It is widely considered that Indonesian 
banking was in a 'vicious' circle of non-performing loans and high real interest rates.
Noting concerns about financial instability, this thesis addresses issues regarding 
financial deregulation and the continuing policy in Indonesia. Unfortunately, data on non­
bank financial institutions is limited, so the analysis has to focus on the banking sector 
and, in particular, on commercial banks as distinct from people's credit banks.3 Banks 
(including Bank Indonesia) hold over 90 per cent of the gross assets of the financial 
sector. The 1992 banking law requires non-bank financial institutions to operate like 
commercial banks. In fact, several of them have changed into commercial banks. The 
shallowness of the capital market made it impossible for them to survive as non-bank 
financial institutions in the newly competitive conditions following deregulation. The 
discussion of banks thus covers most of the financial sector.
For purposes of the analysis, the issues will be divided into two main categories: 
the issues which face the central bank, and the issues which face commercial banks. In 
principle, the issues which face the central bank would consist of issues related to the
3People's credit banks are banks that accept only savings and time deposits. Apart from giving credit to 
people, they can only put their funds into Bank Indonesia (Indonesia’s central bank) certificate 
(Sertifikat Bank Indonesia) time deposits and/or certificate deposits and/or savings deposits of other 
banks. (Bank Indonesia certificate is described in detail in Chapter 2). There are certain activities open 
to commercial banks but not the people’s credit banks. These include foreign exchange, insurance, and 
pension funds activities.
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extent and ways in which government intervention (through the central bank) should 
occur in the banking sector under financial deregulation. This would include issues such 
as: the ability of the central bank to control money supply indirectly and hence maintain 
price stability; supervision of banks together with the enforcement of the legal system; 
and the role of the central bank in a deposit insurance system and lender-of-last-resort 
function.
The issues which face commercial banks would comprise those related to the 
commercial banks' difficulties in adjusting from a restricted, 'cartel-type' banking system 
to the new competitive, market-oriented environment. This would include issues such as: 
professionalism on the part of both bankers and owners; adequacy of skilled staff; 
bankers' understanding of the macro consequences of their banking activities; and the 
management of risks.
This thesis focuses on moral hazard problems in banking resulting from a 
combination of inadequate central bank supervision and the presence of the central bank's 
deposit guarantees on the one hand, and the lack of professionalism and risk management 
skills in commercial banks, on the other hand. This thesis develops a theoretical model of 
the relationship between central bank and commercial banks that can contribute towards 
an efficient and sound banking system. The model identifies elements of an optimal 
contract to alleviate moral hazard problems in banking associated with deposit 
guarantees by the central bank. It modifies the risk-sharing and incentive contract theory 
to construct an optimal risk-sharing relationship between central banks and commercial 
banks in the form of loan insurance. The model is based on Indonesia's experience in 
deregulating its financial (or banking) sector. However, it can also be applicable for 
countries that have experienced banking instability in the same way that Indonesia has.
The organisation of the rest of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
institutional aspects of Indonesian banking and the changes from a repressed to a 
liberalised financial system in Indonesia. Chapter 3 examines current difficulties and 
general issues in Indonesian banking. Chapter 4 presents a review of the literature of the 
theoretical arguments that have been advanced in areas relating to financial deregulation. 
It also analyses the difficulties in Indonesian banking in the context of the Stiglitz and
3
Weiss (1981) model. Chapter 5 develops a theoretical model of state loan insurance for 
the commercial banks and the central bank. Chapter 6 discusses the policy implications of 
the model of state loan insurance. The conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
From a repressed to a liberalised financial system in Indonesia
Introduction
Before deregulation in June 1983, the central bank (Bank Indonesia) and five large 
state-owned banks accounted for most of Indonesia's financial sector. Interest rate and 
credit ceilings were rigidly controlled and a considerable proportion of lending was 
centrally directed. Exchange rates were set by the central bank, but there were no 
restrictions on capital flows. It will be argued that under such a system domestic savings 
were discouraged, the cost of intermediation was high, and financial resources were 
misallocated.
The sharp fall in petroleum earnings beginning in 1982 necessitated 
comprehensive reforms to sustain non-inflationary growth and balance of payments 
viability. Administered interest rates and direct monetary policy controls were considered 
inappropriate for efficient resource allocation and the growth target of 5 per cent per 
annum. Mobilisation of domestic savings through the financial system was urgent. 
Financial deregulation thus began to be introduced on 1 June 1983.
The June 1983 deregulation package included the removal of ceilings on all 
credits, all deposit rates of interest, and most loan rates of interest. Bank Indonesia's 
preferential credits given to priority sectors at subsidised interest rates, known as 
'liquidity credits', were reduced by terminating a number of the high priority credit 
schemes.
From the time of this package until 1988, there were no further banking reforms. 
In this period, Bank Indonesia concentrated on developing the money market. It was 
busy with experimenting and getting used to its new indirect measures of monetary 
control, especially during heavy speculative attacks against the rupiah in 
September-October 1984 and in May-June 1987. A very significant devaluation also 
took place in September 1986.
A second major deregulation package was prepared in October 1988. The three 
most important measures were the free entry and operation of banks and non bank 
financial institutions (NBFIs), the reduction of reserve requirements from 15 per cent to 
2 per cent, and the setting of maximum legal lending limits on banks and NBFIs for 
purposes of prudential supervision. This package was followed by several other measures 
from March 1989 to May 1993, which mainly aimed at strengthening the prudential 
supervision of banks.
This chapter describes the regulated financial system and its impact on the 
development and performance of the financial sector in Indonesia. It then discusses the 
deregulation measures undertaken from 1983 to 1993 and the changes from a repressed 
to a liberalised financial system.
2. 1. The financial system before deregulation
Prior to 1983 the financial system of Indonesia consisted (and still consists) of the 
banking sector, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), and other financial institutions. 
The banking sector comprised the central bank (Bank Indonesia), commercial banks, 
development banks, saving banks, and rural banks. The NBFIs included development, 
investment, and housing financial institutions, while other financial institutions consisted 
of insurance and leasing companies.
As in the past, the financial institutions of Indonesia are government-owned, 
private-owned (both domestic and foreign private), and joint ventures of domestic and 
foreign governments or private investors. The NBFIs and other financial institutions are 
mostly owned by the Indonesian government and Indonesian private sector.
Prior to deregulation in 1983, the central bank and deposit money banks 
dominated the Indonesian financial system. Table 2.1 shows that Bank Indonesia held 43 
per cent of total assets of the financial system in 1982. The deposit money banks held 
another 49 per cent with state banks dominating this group. The rest of the total gross 
assets— about 8 per cent— were held by the NBFIs and the other financial institutions.
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Table 2.1 Number of financial institutions and their assets, 
December 1982
Types of financial 
institution
Number Assets 
(Rp bn)
Share of 
assets (%)
Central bank 1 13,700 43.00
Deposit money banks: 119 15,922 49.00
State owned 5 11,529 36.00
Private domestic 75 1,885 6.00
Foreign/Joint venture 11 1,172 3.00
Development 28 1,336 4.00
Savings banks 1 451 1.50
Rural financial institutions 5807 86 0.30
Money changers
Pawnshops 1 80 0.20
State security and 1 149 0.50
investment companies
NBFIs 13 805 2.00
Other financial institutions: 206 979 3.00
Insurance 91 578 1.80
Leasing 17 114 0.30
Pension funds 79 278 0.90
Others 39
Total 6149 32,179 100
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, various issues, Jakarta.
Instruments of monetary control. Indonesian monetary policies were 
characterised by direct controls, namely interest rate ceilings, domestic credit controls, 
direct credit schemes and high reserve requirements.
Interest rate ceilings. Interest rate restrictions took the form of ceilings on 
deposit and loan rates of the state banks. Private commercial banks and foreign banks 
were not included in these restrictions. A regulation issued in 1967, however, required 
that all public sector entities deposit only with state banks, providing a very large captive 
market for those banks because of the dominant role of the public sector in the economy 
(Nasution 1989, 1991). The explicit and implicit guarantee by the government for 
savings, time, and demand deposits, as well as loan returns, on state banks, and the 
absence of deposit insurance for the other financial institutions, contributed to the 
monopoly position of state banks.
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Table 2.2 Ml and M2 to GDP ratios, 
1968-82 (per cent)
Year Ml/GDP (a) M2/GDP (b)
1968 5.44 6.01
1969 6.77 8.61
1970 7.75 10.22
1971 7.33 10.72
1972 8.90 13.02
1973 8.90 13.12
1974 7.84 12.15
1975 8.97 14.19
1976 9.48 15.56
1977 10.26 15.30
1978 10.26 15.71
1979 9.72 14.99
1980 10.21 15.72
1981 11.16 16.71
1982 11.40 17.73
Notes: (a) Ml = currency +
demand deposits
(b) M2= Ml + time and
saving deposits
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial 
Statistics, various issues, Jakarta.
The purpose of the regulations was to provide low-cost funds to encourage 
investment, particularly for priority sectors such as small scale firms and export oriented 
activities, and to guard against increases in interest rates that were viewed as socially or 
politically unacceptable.
As can be seen from Table 2.2, money supply— indicated by the ratio of narrow 
money (M l) to GDP— rose from 5 per cent in 1968 to 9 per cent in 1972 and 11 per 
cent in 1982. This rise was associated with a relatively high average inflation rate 
between 1972 and 1982 of 17.64 per cent. Consequently real rupiah interest rates on 
both deposits and loans of the state banks were consistently negative (Table 2.3). The 
average nominal deposit rate of interest between 1972 and 1982 was 9.27 per cent, while 
the average nominal lending rate of interest from 1976 to 1982 was 9 per cent.
Credit ceilings. Private Indonesian and foreign branch banks in Indonesia were 
subject to ceilings on the level or growth of bank credit. The credit ceilings were
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implemented in April 1974 to control the monetisation of windfall "petroleum money" 
resulting from the petroleum boom of 1974 to 1982. Petroleum revenues received by 
Pertamina—the monopoly government-owned petroleum company— were placed in 
state banks, mostly in the form of savings and time deposits. The state banks acted as 
providers of funds in interbank money markets. By imposing credit ceilings on private 
banks, the increase in the money supply (Ml) resulting from petroleum income was 
controlled. Credit ceilings were used as instruments of monetary policy. They proved 
effective in controlling domestic credit.
Table 2.3 Deposit and lending rates of interest of state banks, 
1972-82 (per cent)
Year Nominal 
deposit 
rate (a)
Nominal 
lending 
rate (b)
Inflation
rate
Real
deposit
rate
Real
lending
rate
1972 15.00 14.30 6.40 8.10 7.40
1973 12.00 14.30 31.00 -14.50 -12.70
1974 12.00 14.30 40.60 -20.30 -18.70
1975 12.00 14.30 19.10 -6.00 -4.00
1976 12.00 14.30 19.80 -6.50 -4.60
1977 9.00 14.30 11.00 -1.80 3.00
1978 7.50 12.00 8.10 -0.60 3.60
1979 6.80 12.00 18.30 -9.70 -5.30
1980 7.70 12.00 18.00 -8.70 -5.10
1981 8.40 12.00 12.20 -3.40 -0.20
1982 7.90 12.00 9.50 -1.50 2.30
Notes: (a) average of 3, 6 and 12 month maturities
(b) average of working capital and investment loan 
rates
Source: Bank Indonesia, primary data.
Directed credit schemes. Directed credit schemes included direct central bank 
lending to priority sectors (usually state enterprises) and preferential Bank Indonesia 
refinancing facilities or liquidity credits. In 1983 these credits accounted for more than 
34 per cent of total credits in banking. In December 1982, about 40 per cent of the state 
banks credits were in forms of subsidised and small credits (MacIntyre 1991). The state 
banks held over 72 per cent of total deposit money banks' assets in 1982.
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These credits were inflationary since they increased the money base. Liquidity 
credits often went to inefficient investments with low rates of return which burdened 
banks with large non performing loans (Tseng and Corker 1990). It was fortunate, in a 
sense, that there was imperfect compliance under this scheme so that the credit was not 
actually used for the intended sectors. Therefore, the effectiveness of directed credit 
programs, through not providing adequate credit to the so called priority sector, may 
actually have been more efficient than appeared to be the case.
Reserve Requirements. Reserve requirements set by the central bank were 15 
per cent of the so called "third party liabilities of banks". In calculating "third party 
liabilities", state banks had to count only one third of time deposits, while private banks 
had to count 100 per cent of time deposits. In the late 1970s and early 1980s time 
deposits accounted for about 55 per cent of total deposits in banking. Thus the effective 
reserve requirement was between 6 per cent and 8 per cent for most banks. There was 
no interest paid on reserves. This served as an implicit tax on commercial banks that 
increased the cost of financial intermediation.
Development of financial markets. Besides direct controls of the banking 
sector, the financial system was also characterised by segmented financial markets and 
underdeveloped money and capital markets.
Segmented financial markets. There was a high degree of segmentation in the 
financial system. Each type of financial institution was restricted to conduct business 
within its explicitly prescribed sphere. The activities of the limited number of foreign 
banks' were restricted. They were not allowed to open branches outside Jakarta. Entry of 
new institutions into particular market segments was prohibited from 1971. These 
restrictions were allegedly adopted to maintain confidence in the stability of the financial 
system. The provision of credit to 'priority' sectors and to promote the development of 
domestic financial institutions were also cited as reasons.
Underdeveloped capital and money markets. Before deregulation, money and 
capital markets played a very small role in intermediating funds between savers and 
borrowers. Offshore foreign exchange markets provided much of the liquidity needed by 
the Indonesian private sector and banks. Indonesian banks had close relationships with
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offshore banks. They cooperated to arrange loans, deposits, and other activities for fees. 
These activities were 'off-balance sheet’ for domestic banks (Cole and Slade 1990b). 
Interbank loan markets, which were set up to allow banks to manage their short-term 
liquidity had a very high overnight rate during this period.
2 .2 . Impacts of direct monetary controls on the financial sector
A repressed financial system is thought to lead to inefficient allocation of investible 
funds, inefficient investment, and hence low economic growth. Shaw (1973) and 
McKinnon (1973) were the first to identify the relationship between financial sector and 
economic growth in developing countries by emphasising the functions of the financial 
system as financial intermediaries between savers and investors. Gurley and Shaw (1960) 
and Goldsmith (1969) suggested that as real income and wealth increase, the size and the 
complexity of the financial superstructure grow. They did not, however, specify how the 
financial sector affects the real sector.
Shaw and McKinnon argued that if interest rates were administratively fixed 
below their equilibrium level, financial intermediation would not be optimal and the 
allocation of investible funds not efficient. A low level of interest rates would reduce 
incentives to save in financial form and raise the real costs of loanable funds to investors. 
The negative impact of administered interest rates on financial intermediation would take 
the form of increasing information costs to savers and investors, reducing operational 
efficiency and increasing risks. Overall, a less efficient allocation of investible funds, 
resulting in sub-optimal investments, would reduce economic growth.
Credit ceilings caused financial disintermediation as savers and investors sought 
alternative outlets outside the financial system. This stimulated unregulated 'curb' or 
'informal' financial markets that had to charge interest rates above the levels that market 
interest rates might have been. Because of the lack of prudential and other government 
support their costs were high.
The negative real domestic interest rate, together with generally positive real 
dollar interest rates paid abroad and in Indonesia after 1979, and the open foreign
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exchange system, encouraged the movement of both short-term and longer-term funds 
abroad. Some of the movement could be considered as capital flight. Suwidjana (1984) 
showed that the foreign exchange assets and the net foreign asset positions of the deposit 
money banks grew rapidly, especially after 1978, when a sharp devaluation took place 
because of the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate.
Real growth and financial growth were not highly correlated because of capital 
flight ( Cole and Slade 1990b). After a spurt of financial growth (1968 to 1972) the 
financial sector languished during the petroleum boom of the 70s. One interpretation is 
that increases in domestic savings during the boom period were siphoned offshore in the 
form of overseas deposits. A second financial boom began with financial deregulation.
Domestic credit ceilings limited the banks' abilities to mobilise deposits, and 
inhibited growth and competition, as well as contributing to financial disintermediation. 
The offshore markets hence became the main sources of funds. They were used firstly to 
place excess domestic liquidity abroad, and then to accommodate customers whose 
borrowing needs could not be met domestically.
The size and growth of the financial sector can be measured by the ratio of 
financial assets to GDP. There was a significant change of the deposit money banks' net 
assets during the period 1969 to 1982. In 1969 these banks’ net assets were about half of 
the total assets of Bank Indonesia, but by 1972 they were about 25 per cent greater than 
that of Bank Indonesia. By 1982 they were again less than the total assets of Bank 
Indonesia.
The rapid growth of the deposit money banks' assets from 1969 to 1972 was due 
to government increases in nominal interest rate ceilings on bank time deposits. The 
government partially offset the interest rates increase by subsidising banks. In 1972, the 
ceiling on nominal deposit rates of interest was reduced from 21 per cent to 15 per cent. 
In 1982 it was further reduced to 6 per cent. As a result, the growth of the banks' assets 
slowed during the period 1972 to 1982. This demonstrated that the assets of deposit 
money banks were very sensitive to interest rate changes.
Another way of looking at financial growth is through the ratio of broad money 
(M2) to GDP as shown in Table 2.2 (page 8 above) The ratio of M2 to GDP rose by 116
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per cent from 1968 to 1972 when interest rates were high. But as interest rates fell in the 
following ten years from 1972, the ratio of M2 to GDP rose from 13 per cent to 18 per 
cent in 1982 — a rate of increase of only 36 per cent in the ten years. The quasi money to 
GDP ratio(not shown in the table) rose from 0.5 per cent in 1968 to 4 per cent in 1972 
and 6 per cent in 1982. The quasi money to GDP ratios were very low compared to 50 
per cent in Thailand, 80 per cent in Singapore and 90 per cent in Malaysia in 1985. In all 
three countries the ratio of M2 to GDP ratio was over 60 per cent in 1985 (International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook, IMF). These numbers indicate that interest rate controls 
and credit ceilings led to financial disintermediation which was reflected in the slow 
growth of financial assets. The prohibition on entry of new banks discouraged 
competition among financial institutions and further reduced the effectiveness of savings 
mobilisation.
The Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) hypothesis that a financially repressed 
economy lowers the incentive to saving in financial assets has been widely demonstrated 
to hold true empirically (Balassa 1989a, 1989b; World Bank, 1989). It also appears to be 
supported by the Indonesian experience.
2 . 3 . Financial deregulation: 1983 to 1993
In Indonesia, as in other countries, economic difficulties from early 1982 provided the 
catalyst for financial deregulation. High public revenues from the petroleum boom were 
used to fuel high economic growth in the 1970s. At the beginning of 1982 the 
government could no longer rely on petroleum revenues or foreign lenders to balance its 
budget. Earnings from petroleum and gas, almost US$19 billion in 1981/82, dropped to 
US$14.7 billion in 1982/83, and fell further to US$6.9 billion in 1986/87 (Bank 
Indonesia, Annual Report). Real economic growth fell from an annual average of 7.5 per 
cent in 1973-81 to 2.2 per cent in 1982. It became widely recognised that rigid financial 
controls and restrictions reduced mobilisation of savings and hence held back growth.
Before financial deregulation in June 1983, several steps were taken to stabilise 
the economy. To bring the fiscal budget under control, the government scaled down
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budgetary commitments sharply for large investment projects. A large devaluation of the 
rupiah (by 38 per cent) at the end of March 1983 followed. Bank Indonesia reduced its 
swap margin from 2 per cent to 0.25 per cent in February 1983 to attract more foreign 
investments. The swap margin is the premium charged by Bank Indonesia for a (re)swap 
arrangement between itself and a commercial bank for a swap contract between the 
commercial bank and borrowers of foreign exchange abroad.1 Liberal economists within 
the government finally obtained the political power to push ahead with a general reform 
program of which financial reforms were an important component.
With stabilisation policies in place, a major financial deregulation package was 
announced. The June 1983 deregulation was basically aimed at assisting market 
mechanisms in banking to work. Interest rates on both deposits and lending were freed, 
thereby allowing savings to be more effectively mobilised. Combined with deregulation in 
real sector, this would allow financial resources to be efficiently allocated. Since it was 
believed that the efficiency in the allocation of financial resources depended also on the 
structure of the banking industry, a major institutional deregulation followed in October 
1988. To increase competition in banking activities, new banks were allowed to enter the 
market and requirements on branching and foreign activities were simplified.
Deregulation of the credit system was introduced in January 1990. Bank 
Indonesia liquidity credits were restricted to only cooperatives and food procurements. 
Credit activities of banking, however, were not completely free from government 
regulation. The government considered that intervention in the credit market was needed 
in promoting equity. This was done by directing banks to provide a minimum of 20 per 
cent of their loans to small-scale enterprises. The 1990 deregulation was followed by 
another package in February 1991 which mainly consisted of guidelines for a prudent 
banking system. The legal framework for the operations of Indonesian banking was 
introduced in the 1992 Banking Act.2
1 The swap mechanism is discussed in greater detail later in the Chapter, see pages 19-20.
2A chronology of financial deregulation measures is presented in Appendix 2.A. Parallel reforms in 
fiscal, trade, and exchange rate policies in the period 1983-90 were crucial to boosting economic activity 
(Appendix 2.B).
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The financial deregulation measures were thus aimed at enhancing competition 
through a greater reliance on market forces, thus promoting the growth and deepening of 
financial markets, encouraging the domestic financial market to become more integrated 
with international financial centres and decreasing the segmentation in the financial 
sector. It was judged that a competitive financial system would improve efficiency, 
encourage domestic saving mobilisation, reduce the cost of intermediation, and increase 
the efficiency of allocation of financial resources in the economy.
Deregulation of interest rates (1983). The removal of interest rate restrictions 
was intended to generate attractive interest rates in the state banks so that they could 
mobilise deposits, and hence, reduce the dependency of these banks on 'liquidity credits' 
(refinancing of cheap loans) by the Bank Indonesia.
It has been widely argued that reducing interest rate restrictions was necessary to 
help the economy to improve efficiency in the use of financial resources. It was hence 
growth promoting. Balassa (1989b) reviewed empirical evidence on the effects of 
interest rates on savings, including that presented by Fry and Mason (1982), Giovannini 
(1985), Leite and Makonnen (1986) and Khatkhate (1988). He found that the effects of 
changes in interest rates on savings in a two-period model were determined by the 
relative strengths of substitution and income effects. Higher interest rates encourage 
savings because of the substitution effect, but higher interest rates also mean higher 
incomes, and hence higher consumption via the income effect.
The empirical evidence suggests that positive real interest rates favour financial 
over non-financial savings, leading to the deepening of financial markets. Greater 
financial intermediation tends to ensure that the more productive investments are 
financed. Positive real interest rates contribute to economic growth by promoting 
financial deepening and improving the productivity of investment (Calvo and Vegh 1990; 
Sundararajan and Molho 1988).
Private banks were more competitive in lending than in mobilising funds relative 
to state banks. In the absence of deposit insurance and the explicit and implicit guarantee 
by the government for savings, demand, and time deposits of the state banks, state banks 
were considered safer than the private banks, but they offered lower interest rates. The
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extensive branch network of the state banks also contributed to their competitive edge. 
On the other hand, the more complicated and slower lending procedures of state banks 
compared to those of private banks made the private banks more attractive to private 
borrowers even at higher nominal interest rates than those charged by the state banks.
Deregulation of credit ceilings (1983) and directed credit schemes (1983 and 
1990). Direct credit controls on bank lending were eliminated in 1983. Most directed 
sectoral credits were discontinued. Selective credit ceilings were removed. Preferential 
Bank Indonesia rediscounting, in the form of liquidity credits to banks that lent to 
priority sectors, was partly continued, but a large proportion of credits outstanding at the 
end of March 1983 became ineligible for renewal. The elimination of credit ceilings was 
aimed at increasing the banks' ability to mobilise deposits, promote growth and 
competition, and contribute to financial intermediation.
The reduction of subsidised credit was intended to decrease the segmentation of 
the credit market. The loan markets, however, remained distorted. As late as January 
1990 credit policy required that domestic banks allocate a minimum of 20 per cent of 
their credits to small firms and cooperatives. Foreign banks had to assign 50 per cent of 
their lending for export-oriented activities. The continuation of such credit direction 
prevented banks from maximising profits as well as undermining efforts to allocate 
capital efficiently in the economy.
In May 1993 several new regulations sought to reduce these distortions. Penalties 
for banks that could not meet their allocated target were softened. Bank Indonesia 
permitted banks not to meet their targeted allocations of credits to small firms. They 
could buy other banks' small scale loan promissory notes. This meant that banks that did 
not have experience in lending to small firms could pass such lending to other banks that 
did have this experience.
To enhance the development of small scale firms, the maximum subsidised loans 
to small firms were increased from Rp 200 million to Rp 250 million. The government 
also implemented new regulations to develop the small business sector by allocating one
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to five per cent of state enterprises' profits to that sector, channelled through the banking 
system.
Relaxation of regulations on market entry and permissible business 
activities (October 1988). Restrictions on entry were relaxed to enhance efficiency in 
the banking sector by increasing competition. Restrictions on the activities of foreign 
banks were relaxed. New foreign banks were allowed to create joint ventures with 
domestic banks, with a maximum share of 85 per cent foreign ownership. Existing 
foreign banks were allowed to open branches in five large cities (Medan, Bandung, 
Semarang, Surabaya, and Ujung Pandang) as well as Jakarta (to which they had 
previously been restricted). Joint-venture banks could in addition have branches in 
Denpasar.
During the period 1968-87, each state bank formally had to specialise in specific 
economic sectors. After 1987 they were allowed to diversify their assets and incomes by 
expanding operations to different sectors and to undertake activities to reduce the risks 
of their asset portfolios and lessen the segmentation of financial markets. However, 
privatisation of the state banks, was not, and is not, under consideration.
The scope of permissible business activities for different types of financial 
institutions was increased. Commercial banks were allowed to conduct capital 
participation activities in banks or other financial enterprises, such as venture capital and 
security companies. To reduce the dominance of state banks in the financial sector, in 
1988 the state enterprises were allowed to place up to 50 per cent of their deposits in 
non-government-owned financial institutions with a maximum of 20 per cent in any one 
institution. Cole and Slade (1990b) argued that because state banks were the main 
financiers of speculative activities, this policy would also tend to reduce speculation 
against the rupiah. The government also implicitly guaranteed private bank deposits by 
always rescuing troubled banks.
Deregulation of reserve requirement ratios and legal lending limits (1988).
Reserve requirements were reduced from 15 per cent to 2 per cent on all third party
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liabilities (deposits) for all banks in 1988. This reduction was intended to bring down the 
cost of financial intermediation (since reserves earned no interest) and to increase the 
effectiveness of monetary control. At the same time, however, all banks had to buy 
'certificate Bank Indonesia' (SBIs) up to an amount of 80 per cent of their increased 
funds. SBI is a short-term discount bill issued by Bank Indonesia, ranging from 7 to 180 
days. The banks had to buy the so called Pakto (October package) SBIs. The maturity of 
these SBIs was between 3 and 6 months.
The commercial banks considered that the 13 per cent reduction in legally 
required reserves was excessive. As a result, banks were not able to reduce their cash 
balance with Bank Indonesia below 6 per cent inspite of the legally required minimum of 
2 per cent. Cole and Slade (1990) reported that the level of actual reserves of the banks 
declined from Rp3,129 billion to Rp 1,957 billion between the end of October and the end 
of November 1988. But the banks were required to buy Rp 1,904 billion of SBIs, or 
Rp732 billion more than the reduction in their actual reserves. Thus the forced purchase 
of SBIs initially put a severe squeeze on the liquidity position of the commercial banks. 
Interbank loan interest rates rose rapidly as a result. This tendency disappeared quickly 
as most banks managed to meet their legal reserve requirement by increasing their 
efficiency and by borrowing abroad.
To prevent the concentration of loans to a few groups of borrowers, maximum 
legal lending limits were imposed on banks and non bank financial institutions in 1988. 
The maximum lending to a single borrower was set at 20 per cent of the banks' capital. 
To a group of borrowers it was 50 per cent. In May 1993, the maximum lending to a 
group of borrowers was reduced to 20 per cent of the banks' capital. Old loans that 
embodied old regulation were to be reduced to 35 per cent by the end of 1995 and to 20 
per cent by March 1997.
Introduction of money-market instruments as indirect measures of
monetary controls. Bank Indonesia introduced several instruments to control the
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monetary aggregates indirectly. The instruments are the certificate Bank Indonesia (SBI), 
the private sector commercial paper (SBPU), and the reswap facility.
The certificate Bank Indonesia (SBI). The SBI is a liability of Bank Indonesia. 
Bank Indonesia used this instrument to reduce or increase liquidity through selling or 
rebuying. The SBIs were introduced in 1970 but discontinued in 1971 since there was 
little market interest in them. In February 1984 SBIs were re-introduced when Bank 
Indonesia was looking for a new instrument to control the supply of reserve money in 
banking. SBIs were sold directly to banks or through market dealers. A secondary 
market for SBIs and rebuying of SBIs by Bank Indonesia was introduced in 1989.
The Surat Berharga Pasar Uang (SBPU). SBPU is a short-term bill in the form 
of a promissory note or trade bill cosigned by a bank or NBFI that could be rediscounted 
at Bank Indonesia either directly or through an appointed agent. It was introduced in 
February 1985 as a potential instrument for providing liquidity to the banking system 
through a secondary market. The rebuying of SBPUs was not introduced until 1989.
The rediscount rate of SBPUs is determined in auctions and is dependent on how 
many of these bills are offered by banks (and/or non-bank financial institutions), how 
much liquidity Bank Indonesia wishes to provide and what return it is willing to accept. 
Reserve money is thus influenced through this mechanism. Rediscount rates on SBPUs 
are usually above those of SBIs.
The foreign exchange swap facility. This facility was introduced by Bank 
Indonesia in 1979 to eliminate foreign exchange risk for foreign investors, while at the 
same time, providing rupiah liquidity. Indonesian residents borrowing foreign exchange 
abroad would arrange a swap contract with an onshore bank and have the right to 
exchange the rupiah in the future at the current spot exchange rate. The onshore bank 
could then arrange a swap with Bank Indonesia. By entering into such an arrangement, 
Bank Indonesia stood ready to take over the risk of the swap. Bank Indonesia would buy 
foreign currencies from the commercial bank at the current spot exchange rate and agree 
to sell the same amount of foreign currencies back to the commercial bank at a specified
19
future date at the current spot rate. Bank Indonesia would charge the bank a swap 
margin for the arrangement. The swap margin was set by Bank Indonesia based on the 
difference between the average rupiah deposit rate in Indonesian banks and dollar deposit 
rate in international banks in Singapore.
The swap mechanism was one-way, that is, it guaranteed a future exit rupiah per 
dollar rate for dollars entering Indonesia but not a future re-entry rate for rupiahs leaving 
Indonesia. The one-way mechanism induced capital inflows whenever the domestic 
interest rate was higher than the international (dollar) interest rate plus the swap margin 
(Woo and Hirayama 1994). Initially the swap margin was set at 2.5 per cent per annum, 
with the maturity of the swaps ranging from 30 to 180 days. The increasing domestic 
interest rate after the first financial deregulation in 1983 made Bank Indonesia raise the 
margin to 4.5 per cent in March 1983, to 8 per cent in October 1986, and to 9 per cent in 
1987 in order to discourage capital inflows.
The interbank loan market is based on SBPUs, SBIs, and promissory notes. The 
Jakarta Clearing System is the interbank call money market organised by Bank Indonesia 
in 1974. Before 1988 Bank Indonesia adjusted the level of interbank borrowing by 
lowering and raising the ceilings of third party liabilities that could be obtained from 
interbank transactions. In October 1988 these ceilings were removed.
Despite the introduction of new money market instruments in 1984, the money 
market grew slowly until 1989. A sharp drop in world petroleum prices led to an 
acceleration in the rate of depreciation of the Rupiah by Bank Indonesia in 1984. A 
further devaluation followed in 1986. From 1984 through 1986, there was a consistent 
net outflow of foreign exchange from Bank Indonesia, while commercial banks built up 
their foreign exchange holdings (Cole and Slade 1990). The money market therefore 
grew slowly.
Speculation against the rupiah continued until 1987 when the government 
contracted reserve money and set out to create stable expectations. The main aim of 
the contraction was to reduce the liquidity of the state banks which funded speculation
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against the rupiah. The major instrument for stabilising expectation was the rate of 
depreciation of the rupiah against US dollar, set by the Bank Indonesia (Cole and Slade 
1990b). The October 1988 deregulation package activated the domestic money market. 
The growth of the money market was pushed further by the 1989 deregulation that 
removed ceilings on offshore borrowing by banks and replaced them by a limit on the net 
foreign exchange position of foreign exchange banks (banks that engage in foreign 
exchange transactions) at 25 per cent of their total capital. Ceilings on offshore 
borrowing by banks, however, were reimposed in October 1991.
Capital Adequacy Ratio (1991). The policy package of February 1991 
included regulation on capital adequacy which provided guidelines for bank supervision. 
They aimed to prevent banks from taking excessive risks and to increase bank safety. 
Before 1991 capital adequacy was based on a capital adequacy ratio based on the quality 
of assets and capital availability. Off balance sheet items were not included in calculating 
capital adequacy.
In February 1991 Indonesia adopted capital adequacy standards set by the Bank 
for International Settlements, of 8 per cent of the risk-weighted assets. Banks were 
allowed to meet this requirement in steps: 5 per cent by the end of March 1992, 7 per 
cent by the end of March 1993, and 8 per cent by the end of December 1993. Capital 
was defined as the sum of paid-in capital, general and specific reserves and retained 
earnings, and sub-ordinated and two step loans. Sub-ordinated and two step loans were 
government guaranteed foreign borrowings, mainly channelled through state banks 
(Nasution 1992a). In February 1991 only 50 per cent of retained earnings were counted 
as capital. To ease the banks' burdens, in May 1993 Bank Indonesia increased the 
percentage of retained earnings that could be counted as capital to 100 per cent. 
Risk-weighted loans to state enterprises and unused credit facilities were reduced from 
100 per cent to 50 per cent of weighting.
In February 1991 and October 1992 regulations regarding the opening of new 
bank branches as well as bank ownership were tightened. Banks had to have sound
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performance and adequate capital for 12 months before opening new branches. Family 
ties, including husbands, wives, parents-in-law and daughters and sons-in-law were not 
to be in the majority of a bank board and among commissioners of banks. Foreigners 
were permitted to buy domestic private banks' shares up to 49 per cent of total shares.
2.4. The changes in banking
Restructuring the banking sector to create a competitive environment produced 
impressive results.3 The number of private domestic and foreign/joint-venture banks 
rose dramatically within five years from December 1988. In December 1993 there were 
232 banks with some 4,500 branches (Table 2.4). This is a high number compared with 
39 banks in Malaysia, 25 in the Philippines, and 15 in Thailand (though these economies 
are admittedly smaller). It is also high compared to bank numbers in large advanced 
countries with branch banking system. The relatively large number of banks plus non 
bank financial institutions led to intense competition to attract depositors and borrowers. 
The growth of banking accompanied a rapid expansion of private sector investment and 
(non-petroleum) exports, which were the driving forces behind rapid growth during the 
period 1987-90. Non-petroleum exports grew by 23.9 per cent a year and private sector 
investment grew by 22.4 per cent a year (Appendix 2C).
The banking sector was highly fragmented in terms of size (many banks 
established after 1988 were very small). They offered widely differing interest rates. 
However, between 1988 and the end of 1992 there were no bank mergers. As will be 
seen in Chapter 3, only recently, when banks faced solvency difficulties, did merger 
moves begin. But it was too late. Solvency problems hindered the merger process.
3Data on non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) is limited, so analysis has to focus on the banking 
sector and, in particular, on commercial banks as distinct from people's credit banks. Banks (including 
Bank Indonesia) hold over 90 per cent of the gross assets of the financial sector. The 1992 banking law 
requires NBFIs to operate like commercial banks. In fact, several NBFIs have changed into commercial 
banks. The shallowness of the capital market made it impossible for them to survive in the newly 
competitive conditions following deregulation (Nasution 1992a). The discussion of banks thus covers 
most of the financial sector.
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Table 2.4 Number and assets of deposit money banks and central bank, selected
years
1988 1993 1982 (Apr) 1994 1982 1994
Types of Banks Number Total assets (Rptrill) Share of assets (%)
Central Bank 1 1 13.71 62.44 46.2 21.9
Deposit money banks: 108 232 15.92 223.33 53.8 78.1
State 5 5 11.53 88.99 38.9 31.1
Private domestic 63 158 1.88 93.62 6.5 32.8
Foreign/joint venture 11 39 1.17 18.33 3.9 6.4
Development 29 29 1.34 18.82 4.5 6.6
State saving (a) 1 1 3.57 1.2
Total 109 233 29.62 285.77 100 100
Total bank branches 1874 4522
Note: (a) State saving bank was not included in deposit money banks before May 1989.
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, various issues, Jakarta.
The restructuring of banking was reflected in a shifting composition of bank 
assets. As shown in Table 2.4, the central bank's share of total bank assets declined 
continuously, falling from 46 per cent of total assets of the banking sector in December 
1982 to 22 per cent in April 1994. The deposit money banks' asset share rose from nearly 
54 per cent to almost 78 per cent. The asset share of state commercial banks decreased 
less rapidly from nearly 39 per cent to 30 per cent of total assets of the banking sector in 
the same period.
Among deposit money banks (excluding Bank Indonesia), the state banks' asset 
share decreased from 72 per cent in 1982 to 40 per cent in 1994, while those of private 
commercial banks increased from 12 per cent to 42 per cent. This shift of asset shares 
resulted from a combination of the reduction of preferential credits, the elimination of 
credit ceilings, and the rapid expansion in the number of commercial banks and their 
branches. It was believed that liquidity credits from Bank Indonesia accounted for a large 
percentage of the total credits of the state banks before 1983. The rapid expansion of 
private banks which offered higher deposit interest rates than the state banks, made the 
state banks less attractive for depositors. Together with the reductions of liquidity credits 
in 1983 and 1990, and the elimination of credit ceilings, this led to lower growth of 
assets of the state banks. The dominance of the state commercial banks was ended.
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Table 2.5 Average annual growth of time and saving 
deposits by groups of banks, selected years
(per cent)
1988-90 1990-93 1988-93
Saving deposits
State banks 59 56 57
Private Banks 315 54 158
Development Banks 83 63 71
Foreign/joint venture 120 30 42
Total 114 55 78
Time deposits
State banks 36 8 19
Private banks 65 15 35
Development banks 41 27 33
Foreign/joint venture 57 8 28
Total 48 11 26
Source: Bank Indonesia, primary data.
The assets share of foreign/joint-venture banks increased only slightly from 7 per 
cent in 1982 to 8 per cent in April 1994 because regulations still limit their opening of 
branch offices and other activities. These regulations persist because it is feared that 
foreign banks would otherwise take too great a domestic market share. These banks are 
also not permitted to compete with domestic banks in the retail/middle level to mobilise 
savings.
Rising interest rates led to rapid mobilisation of funds. Indonesian domestic 
savings during the period 1968-88 were positively correlated to real deposit interest 
rates (Nasution 1992a). Several new savings products offered by private commercial 
banks after 1988 proved very attractive. Private commercial banks took the lead from the 
state banks in attracting saving deposits. In the five and a half years to May 1994 
commercial banks' saving deposits share increased from 19 per cent to 51 per cent of the 
total for the banking sector, while that of the state banks decreased from 77 per cent to 
45 per cent (Table 2.8). Between 1988 and May 1994 private banks saving deposits 
grew very rapidly, leaving other banks far behind (Table 2.5).
The high interest rates on deposits of private commercial banks changed the 
share of time deposits in the banking sector. Table 2.8 indicates that the state banks
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experienced a decrease in the share of time deposits from 58 per cent in December 1988 
to 42 per cent in May 1994, while the share for private commercial banks increased from 
34 to 50. The time deposits of private banks grew most rapidly (Table 2.5).
Table 2.6 Monetary indicators, 1982-93
Year Ml M2 Ml/GDP M2/GDP
(Rp trill.) (Rp trill.) (%) (%)
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
7.12
7.57
8.58
10.10 
11.68 
12.68 
14.39
20.11 
23.82 
26.34 
28.78 
37.04
11.07
14.66 
17.94 
23.15
27.66 
33.88 
41.99 
58.70 
84.63 
99.06 
119.05 
145.60
11.40
9.74
9.56
10.43
11.39
10.19
10.32
11.85
12.04
11.59
11.22
17.73
18.88
19.99
23.91
23.97
27.21
30.12
35.37
42.80
43.60
46.41
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics,
various issues, Jakarta; International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 
various issues, Washington, DC.
The commercial banks' expansion also resulted in financial deepening. M2/GDP 
increased significantly, from 18 per cent in December 1982 to 30 per cent in December 
1988 and to 43 per cent in December 1990. M2 increased by more than 28 per cent 
annually from December 1988 to December 1993 (Table 2.6).
Loans outstanding grew most rapidly during the period 1988-90. Outstanding 
loans of private and foreign/joint-venture banks grew annually by more than double 
those of state banks (Table 2.7). The share of credit outstanding of the state banks fell by 
40 per cent from 1982 to 1994. The share of credit outstanding of private commercial 
banks increased by 266 per cent during the same period (Table 2.8).
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Table 2.7 Average annual growth of credit outstanding by 
groups of banks, selected years (per cent)
1982-88 1988-90 1990-93 1982-93
State banks 24 37 10 21
Private banks 44 81 21 45
Development banks 22 39 16 24
Foreign/joint venture 20 81 24 32
Sub total 27 51 15 28
BI direct credits (a) -3 -26 -13 -10
Liquidity credits 25 2 -2 13
Total 23 39 13 23
Note: (a) BI is Bank Indonesia.
Source: Bank Indonesia, primary data.
Table 2.8 Share of saving and time deposits and 
share of outstanding credits by groups 
of banks, selected years (per cent)
State
banks
Private
banks
Develop­
ment banks
Foreign
banks
Saving
deposits
1988 77 19 4 0
1994 45 51 4 0
Time deposits 
1988 58 34 1 7
1994 42 50 1 7
Outstanding
credits
1982 77 12 4 7
1994 46 44 2 8
Source: Bank Indonesia, Primary data.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter shows that, as expected, under implicit and explicit guarantees on bank 
deposits as well as loans for both state and private banks, financial deregulation led to 
banking expansion in terms of numbers of banks, assets and liabilities. In addition to 
increasing savings and investment as suggested by Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) , 
the main objective of financial deregulation was also to achieve an efficient capital
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allocation in the economy as first hinted by Goldsmith (1969). In fact, many studies have 
supported the argument that the main channel of transmission from financial 
development to growth is the efficiency of investment, rather than its volume 
(Diaz-Allejandro 1985; Bencivenga and Smith 1990; Lee 1991; Levine 1992; de 
Gregorio and Guidotti 1992).
Hence, financial deregulation must be aimed at not only increasing the quantity of 
investible funds, but also improving the quality of bank assets and liabilities. To have an 
optimal impact on growth, financial deregulation should be done under prudential 
supervision. Financial intermediation and growth may have a negative correlation 
resulting from financial deregulation in a poor regulatory environment (de Gregorio and 
Guidotti 1992). In the presence of deposit insurance by the government, financial 
deregulation without prudential supervision may lead to moral hazard problems in 
banking. For example, banks undertake very risky lending at unnaturally high real loan 
rates of interest. In Indonesia, banking supervision was not introduced until 1989, six 
years after the first major financial deregulation. There were also explicit and implicit 
guarantees on bank deposits by the government. The next chapter discusses the effects of 
financial deregulation under explicit and implicit guarantees on banks deposits as well as 
loan returns in a poor supervisory environment.
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Chapter 3
Current difficulties in Indonesian banking
Introduction
Banking grew rapidly, especially since deregulation began in 1983 until m id -1990. The 
series of deregulation packages, aimed at reducing government intervention and 
enhancing market forces, markedly improved competitiveness in banking and led to 
financial deepening. The growth of banking accompanied a rapid expansion of private 
sector investment, consumption expenditures, and (non-petroleum) exports, which were 
the driving forces behind rapid growth during the period 1987-90. During this period, 
private sector investment grew by 22.4 per cent annually, while consumption expenditure 
and non-petroleum exports grew annually by 13.5 and 23.9 per cent respectively. 
Reforms in fiscal, trade, and exchange rate policies, initiated in the period 1983-90, had 
been crucial in boosting economic activity.
While there were clear benefits from financial deregulation for economic activity, 
the extremely rapid expansion of banking— in terms of the number of banks, assets and 
liabilities— was not costless. The less beneficial effects of deregulation began to be felt in 
m id-1990 to the present.
This chapter examines current difficulties in the banking sector and identifies the 
factors most responsible. The main emphasis is on the post-banking boom or the 
consolidation phase, from m id-1990 to the present time. It emphasises the incidence of 
high real interest rates following financial deregulation in 1983, after a period of negative 
real interest rates before deregulation. For the purposes of this chapter, interest rates are 
considered high if they are positive by three or more percentage points in real terms. 
Indonesia's real interest rates were relatively high compared with other countries as 
discussed in the next section. The purpose of this chapter is to define the issues which 
the theoretical model in Chapter 5 will explore.
3.1. Difficulties in the banking sector post-deregulation
Rapid expansion of the number of commercial banks and their branches from 1988 
resulted in a highly competitive environment that stimulated deposits. Relatively high real 
interest rates continued after 1984. Table 3.1 indicates that from 1980 to 1983 the 
average real deposit rate of interest was 1.32 per cent. It jumped to 9.25 per cent 
between 1984 and 1993. Table 3.2 shows that from 1985 to 1993 the average real loan 
rate of interest was 11.9 per cent. The average real deposit rate between 1984 and 1990 
was 9.24 per cent, and the average real loan rate was 12.4 per cent (1985 to 1990). 
These numbers are relatively high compared to Malaysia, Korea and Chile. The real 
deposit rates were also higher in Indonesia than in Thailand.
Table 3.1 Average real deposit rate of interest, 
selected countries (per cent)
Year Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Korea Chile
1980 -4.20 -0.40 -6.40 -7.20 1.70
1981 1.80 -0.10 -4.20 17.70
1982 4.30 3.70 7.40 0.80 34.50
1983 3.40 4.20 8.90 4.40 0.50
1984 7.50 5.40 12.00 6.70 6.50
1985 1 1.50 8.40 10.30 7.40 1.00
1986 8.90 6.40 7.80 7.10 -0.40
1987 7.20 2.10 6.90 6.70 4.50
1988 9.40 5.40 2.70 0.40
1989 10.8 1.70 3.90 4.10 9.10
1990 9.4 3.20 6.00 1.30 11.30
1991 11.4 0.50
1992 12.7
1993 3.7
Note: the real interest rates were calculated by the following formula: Rt=((rt-A
p/p))* 100, where Rt is per unit real rate of interest (for loans and deposits as used by Galbis 
1993), rt is per unit nominal rate of interest, and Ap/p is per unit change in the consumer 
price index.
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Monthly Report, various issues, Jakarta; Galbis, V., 1993. 
High Real Interest Rates Under Financial Liberalization: is there a 
problem?, Working Paper WP/93/7, IMF, Washington, DC.
High real interest rates may not be a problem if they reflect high real rates of 
return on investment. They can, however, be undesirable if they are the result of causes
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such as high inflation, stabilisation effort that failed to be fully credible and 'moral hazard’ 
resulting from explicit or implicit deposit insurance. Galbis (1993) examined 28 countries 
(both developed and developing) which experienced high real interest rates after financial 
deregulation. He claimed that the high real rates of interest were caused by inflation, less 
than credible stabilisation programs and moral hazard resulting from explicit and implicit 
deposit insurance. Galbis argued that financial deregulation also had many favourable 
effects such as increased competition in banking, but the negative results led to lower 
investment growth and corporate and financial distress. They also destabilised capital 
inflows and increased budget deficits and government debt. Before the aggressive 
behaviour of banks in lending and other businesses took effect in late 1991, banks had 
been run efficiently. This was reflected in the continuous decrease in margins (the 
difference between lending and deposit rates of interest) from 1986 to 1991, before they 
rose significantly in 1992 and 1993 (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Average real lending rate of interest 
selected countries (per cent)
year Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Korea Chile
1980 1.00 -1.40 -8.30 8.90
1981 -1.10 5.60 -3.30 27.00
1982 2.80 13.10 4.30 49.10
1983 7.10 13.40 6.40 12.20
1984 7.20 17.70 7.50 15.40
1985 15.40 11.20 16.20 7.40 7.70
1986 13.50 10.00 14.90 7.10 5.70
1987 10.20 7.30 12.20 6.70 10.80
1988 12.00 5.20 10.70 2.80 5.70
1989 13.20 4.10 9.20 5.30 16.10
1990 10.10 4.40 1.30 18.10
1991 11.60 5.60
1992 14.50
1993 6.40
Note: see Table 3.1 for real interest rate formula.
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Monthly Report, various issues, Jakarta; Galbis, V.,
1993. High Real Interest Rates Under Financial Liberalization: is there 
a problem?, Working Paper WP/93/7, IMF, Washington, DC.
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The government's success in curbing inflation from 1990 to 1991 exacerbated the 
high real interest rates1. Money supply had grown significantly, especially in 1989. The 
growth of Ml increased from 13.5 per cent in 1988 to 39.8 per cent in 1989 but fell to 
18.4 per cent in 1990 before it increased again to 28.9 per cent in 1993. Until 1990, the 
growth of M2, however, continued to rise from 23.9 per cent in 1988 to 39.8 per cent in 
1989 and to 44.2 per cent in 1990, but fell to 22.3 per cent in 1993. The increase in the 
growth of money supply— both Ml and M2— in 1989, coupled with the rise of domestic 
petroleum prices and transportation costs in 1990, put pressure on domestic inflation in 
the first half of 1990 (Figure 3.1). The average rate of inflation during the 1980s and the 
early 1990s was around 9 per cent. The relatively high inflation rate pushed up nominal 
interest rates. The nominal deposit rate of interest from 1984 to 1993 averaged 19 per 
cent per annum, and the nominal lending rate of interest averaged 21 per cent. Both 
deposit and lending rates of interest experienced their peak levels in 1991 at 23 per cent 
and 27 per cent respectively as a result of a severe monetary contraction to curb the 
upward pressure on inflation. In 1993, these levels dropped to around 11 per cent and 18 
per cent respectively.
Figure 3.1 Rate of growth of money supply and inflation (per cent)
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Source: Bank Indonesia, Annual Report, various issues, Jakarta.
To reduce inflationary pressures, Bank Indonesia tightened domestic liquidity in 
the following ways: Bank Indonesia's liquidity credits were reduced; the maximum net
*The expectation of sharp depreciations of exchange rate was also a significant component of the high 
interest rate in this year (Woo and Hirayama 1994).
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open foreign exchange position, which was set at 25 per cent of bank capital in October
1989 when ceilings on offshore borrowing by banks were lifted, was reduced to 20 per 
cent in February 1991 ;2 by October 1991, ceilings on offshore borrowing by banks were 
reimposed. Bank Indonesia's outstanding liquidity credits fell by more than 25 per cent 
(Rp 4,390 billion) from March 1990 to March 1991; Bank Indonesia raised the annual 
interest rate on SBIs from 11.33 per cent in March 1990 to 22 per cent in March 1991. 
Several large state-owned enterprises were instructed to convert their deposits with 
domestic banks into SBIs. As a result, Rp 8.1 trillion of state-owned enterprise deposits 
were converted into SBIs (Bank Indonesia, Annual Report 1990/91). Within a few days, 
however, Bank Indonesia purchased SBPUs of Rp 6.1 trillion.3 The net liquidity squeeze 
from contractionary non market operations in February 1991, therefore, amounted to Rp 
2 trillion, or about 3.6 per cent of base money.
Monetary tightening brought a slow down in the expansion of banking between
1990 and 1993. Savings deposits grew by 55 per cent annually during this period 
compared to 114 per cent from 1988 to 1990. Time deposits’ growth fell from more than 
48 per cent to 11 per cent. The growth of total outstanding loans also declined from 
about 39 per cent to 13 per cent. In addition, the already high rates of interest were 
increased further. As pointed out earlier, average real loan rates of interest had not been 
less than 10 per cent since 1988 and rose to 16.5 per cent in June 1991. The high rates of 
interest caused many borrowers to default. The banking system ran into a 'vicious circle' 
of bad debt, that is, default loans (loans written off) and non-performing loans (loans on 
which no interest has been paid for three months or more) and high interest rates. 
Soedradjat Djiwandono— governor of the Bank Indonesia— announced that the amount 
of bad debt in banking in May 1993 was about Rp 3.66 billion or nearly three per cent of 
the total outstanding credits of banks. The amount of non performing loans was much 
larger than the amount of bad debts (Kompas 31 May 1993).
2In September 1994, the maximum net foreign exchange position was again increased to 25 per cent of 
bank capital.
3The conversion of state enterprise deposits into SBIs was primarily intended to reduce the ability of 
state banks to finance speculative activities. This was the reason for having the opposing actions by 
Bank Indonesia.
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Furthermore, the expansion of the number of banks and their branches, especially 
of commercial banks, made it difficult for the central bank (Bank Indonesia) to put into 
operation an 'early warning system' to monitor banks and to spot problem areas before 
they became critical. Three small private banks collapsed at the end of 1990 and at the 
beginning of 1991, although ultimately no depositor suffered losses. The liquidation in 
December 1992 of Bank Summa, formerly one of the ten largest private banks, was a 
shock to the financial community. Almost 70 percent of its loan portfolio consisted of 
non-performing loans. The government, in a tough stance, forced the bank to be 
liquidated. Many people in the industry believed that other private commercial banks had 
similar problems to Bank Summa's, although to lesser degrees. The banking system was 
placed in a difficult position when Bank Indonesia ruled that banks had to meet capital 
adequacy ratios of 7 per cent by the end of March 1993, and 8 per cent by the end of 
December 1993. (In February 1991, the capital adequacy was set at 8 per cent of the 
risk-weighted assets. It rose from 5 per cent at the end of March 1992 to 7 per cent at 
the end of March 1993 and to 8 per cent at the end of December 1993).
In the first few months of 1993, several other worrying problems occurred. Large 
domestic depositors pulled out their money in 'mini' runs on several banks in January and 
February. The victims included Bank Central Asia, the largest private bank, and Bank 
Bali, which is considered one of the soundest. Some funds left Indonesia for Singapore, 
while others shifted from private banks to state banks. Foreign creditors were also 
pulling back. Japanese banks and a Singapore bank, two major sources of offshore 
borrowing, reduced their lending (Far Eastern Economic Review 1 April 1993).
The condition of the five largest state banks (including a development bank and a 
saving bank) was even more difficult than that of the private banks. They started with 
many debts related to subsidised and small credits. After years of functioning more as 
managers of government development funds than as bankers, by providing subsidised 
credits to government determined priority sectors, small business credits, and state 
enterprise credits or politically tied lending, these banks did not know how to lend in 
competitive circumstances. Many of the projects to which they lent had no commercial 
justification, for example, a loan scandal concerned approximately Rpl.3 trillion given at
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the beginning of 1994 by the state owned Indonesian Development Bank (Bapindo) to a 
petrochemical project, Golden Key. The loan was granted mainly because of the 
influence of the Minister of Politics and Safety Coordination, Sudomo, and Finance 
Minister, J.B. Sumarlin. Industry sources believe that many state banks loans to big 
projects reflected political intluences.
The situation was already deteriorating when formerly creditworthy borrowers 
began to stop servicing their loans, partly as a result of the economic slow-down and 
high rates of interest, but partly because they thought they could get away with it. The 
exact percentage of non-performing loans for each bank is not available, but in February 
1994 Djiwandono announced that non-performing loans held by the seven state banks 
amounted to US$7 billion in October 1993, or 21.2 per cent of all outstanding state 
banks' credit and 15.8 per cent of total outstanding credit in the banking sector. Many 
observers believe that the state banks were in very serious difficulties with only 
government backing enabling them to continue operating.
3.2 . Causes of the banking difficulties
Three main factors caused the high real interest rates: high exchange rate risk, a thin 
money market and supervision difficulties.
(i) High exchange rate risk. Attempts to hold exchange rates constant in the 
face of substantial inflationary pressures are inevitably followed by large depreciations. 
Galbis (1993) showed how extreme policy stances of this type led to high real interest 
rates in, among other countries, Chile in 1982, Argentina especially in 1981-82 and 
1989, and Brazil in the early 1980s. Dominguez (1993) found that unpublicised central 
bank exchange rate policy or interventions (which make up most of all intervention 
operations in Indonesia), increased volatility in exchange rates in the United States and 
Germany. Furthermore, any exchange rate system based on a preannounced managed 
floating or crawling peg in an inflationary period, tends to perpetuate overvaluation of 
the exchange rate and increase exchange rate risks. Real rates of interest rise to 
compensate for the (expected) declining international value of the domestic currency.
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Indonesian foreign exchange controls were abolished in 1971. From 1971 to 
1978 (the 'petroleum boom' period) the rupiah was pegged to the US dollar. Domestic 
inflation was above that of the United States so that the rupiah became overvalued. In 
November 1978 the mpiah was devalued by 50 per cent and a managed float system was 
adopted. The nominal exchange rate was depreciated 3 per cent per annum to 1982. 
However, these devaluations were not sufficient to compensate for the inflation 
differential between Indonesia and its trading partners (Rasyid 1992). From 1978 to 
1982, the real effective exchange rate index appreciated by approximately 50 per cent. 
The real effective exchange rate index is defined as the relative price index of domestic to 
foreign non petroleum and gas traded goods multiplied by the nominal exchange rate. An 
increase in the real effective exchange rate index means appreciation of the rupiah. The 
drop in petroleum prices led to a further rupiah devaluation (by 39 per cent against the 
US dollar) in March 1983 to stimulate non petroleum exports.
As petroleum prices continued to fall , the current account deficit widened. The 
public expectations of another large devaluation increased. The rupiah came under 
heavy speculative attacks in September-October 1984. The real effective exchange rate 
index between 1983 and 1985 appreciated by about 80 per cent and the nominal 
exchange rate index appreciated by 120 per cent (Figure 3.2). The rupiah was then 
devalued by 50 per cent in September 1986.
Figure 3.2 Real effective and nominal exchange rate index, 1983-93
(1988=100)
Source: Bank Indonesia, primary data.
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In May-June 1987 another speculative attack on the rupiah took place. In 1987 
the nominal exchange rate depreciated by 5 per cent per annum to stem speculation. 
However, another speculation against the rupiah took place in February-March 1991, as 
petroleum prices rose during the Gulf War. By the end of 1991, the real effective 
exchange rate was 59 per cent below its 1980 level and 40 per cent below its 1971 level 
(Rasyid 1992). Figure 3.2 shows that from 1987 to 1993 (January) there was no 
appreciation of the rupiah.
Continuing speculations against the rupiah indicated that a substantial exchange 
rate risk resulted from both small, constant depreciations and the series of major 
devaluations from 1978 to 1986. Exchange rate management was not only difficult 
because of 'booming sector' effects but because in a small open economy like Indonesia’s, 
international price changes in the booming sector were inevitably translated into changes 
in domestic prices. The exchange rate risk was thus to a significant degree the result of 
exogenous forces. A fully flexible market exchange rate would have also resulted in high 
exchange rate volatility. It has been argued, moreover, that in the presence of capital 
flows, even freely floating exchange rates cannot insulate countries from real external 
disturbances (Caves, Frankel, and Jones 1993:527).
The managed float system adopted by Indonesia in an inflationary period led to 
overvaluation of the exchange rate and increased exchange rate risks. To compensate for 
the declining international value of the domestic currency, real rates of interest had to 
rise.
(ii) A thin money market. The scope for direct controls of the money supply 
was significantly reduced by financial liberalisation. Direct controls over the money 
supply were abandoned before a money market was fully established. But to enable the 
government to manage the money supply indirectly, a money market had to be 
developed.
It has to be expected that an increase in interest rates would lead to increased 
capital inflows, both of foreign capital and of the repatriation of domestic funds placed 
abroad during previous periods of financial repression. Together with the removal of
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credit ceilings, this would raise the money supply. Relying on open market operations in 
an underdeveloped money market could not reduce the supply of money.
The Indonesian case did not follow this expected theoretical pattern in the early 
1980s. Although there was some inflow of foreign funds after devaluation and the rise in 
domestic interest rates, there was not a large increase in bank credit, domestic spending, 
or inflation. The highly bureaucratic state banks, which still held over 72 per cent of total 
bank assets in December 1982, responded sluggishly to the removal of loan ceilings. As 
discussed above, when the petroleum price was falling, and the current account deficit 
widening, the rupiah coming under heavy speculative attacks in September-October 
1984, a capital outflow drained the monetary base. A transfer of government deposits 
from the state banks to Bank Indonesia to reduce speculation, further reduced the 
supply of reserve money in the financial system.
The absence of a money market left Bank Indonesia without effective instruments 
to increase the liquidity to the banks. As a consequence, the domestic inter-bank interest 
rate on overnight funds sky-rocketed to 90% per annum. Bank Indonesia had to bring 
this rate down by supplying large amounts of 3 to 6 month credits through its discount 
facility into the banking system. The two money market instruments, SBIs and SBPUs, 
which were introduced in February 1984 and February 1985 respectively, came too late 
to affect liquidity.
The situation was repeated in two other speculative attacks on the rupiah in May- 
June 1987 and in February-March 1991. Instead of raising the interest rates on money 
market instruments, the government forced banks and state enterprises to buy SBIs and 
repurchase SBPUs before maturity. The use of non-market instruments shifted 
profitability from the banks to Bank Indonesia. A sharp increase in the inter-bank interest 
rate following the reduction in reserve money indicated a shortage in the money supply. 
The government's inability to influence base money smoothly thus resulted in excesses 
and shortages of bank liquidity, and increased the volatility and level of interest rates.
Rigidly controlled interest rates and the limited nature of government money 
market instruments delayed the development of the money market. The generally lower 
interest rates of SBIs and SBPUs than banking deposit interest rates also made these
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instruments relatively unattractive. There were no SBPUs outstanding at the end of 
1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990. SBPUs outstanding declined dramatically from 1991 until 
1993. The amount of SBIs outstanding fell drastically from 1989, so that they could not 
be used to increase the reserve base. In times of liquidity shortages, banks would rather 
go to the inter-bank market or borrow offshore. As increasing foreign liabilities show, 
offshore borrowing by banks became very significant after the abolition of the ceilings on 
borrowing from March 1989 until October 1991 when the ceilings were reimposed. 
Within one year from March 1989, foreign borrowing jumped by more than 900 per cent 
(from $575 million to $5,856 million), and from December 1990 to January 1992 it 
increased by 45 percent (Nasution 1992b).
Another source of difficulty in using market-based open market operations lay in 
the inability of Bank Indonesia to monitor the growth of monetary aggregates quickly 
and accurately. The Ml aggregate was known only after a three month lag, after Bank 
Indonesia received deposit data from every bank in the country. With an open capital 
account regime, the computation of Ml became too slow for policy needs. Bank 
Indonesia could not quickly detect growth in money aggregates. It had to use non- 
market operations to influence the money supply quickly.
There is a technical problem (communications with other islands outside Java) 
that makes definitive bank balance sheets unavailable for three months. Reasonable 
approximations, however, can be made on the basis of accounts from almost all (if not 
all) the banks where there are no communication problems and these should be available 
very shortly after the month-end, if not daily. Woo (1991) suggested that Bank Indonesia 
should require the largest banks (the 5 state banks and 10 private banks which control 
about 57% of bank branches and 89% of M l), to report their deposit information on the 
following day, but this was not done.
The government has been reluctant to borrow domestically via bond issues to 
finance, at least partly, the fiscal gap between domestic revenues and expenditures. 
Besides reducing the debt burden, issuance of domestic bonds would also diversify 
money market instruments. 'Soft foreign borrowing' is not a reason for the government 
to borrow abroad except to satisfy very parochial auditing requirements. The
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government should determine its domestic debt issues on the basis of domestic liquidity 
requirements.
(iii) Policies that encourage banks to make poor loans. Lack of bank 
supervision, especially prior to 1993, is believed to be an important factor for banks to 
make poor loans. The goal of bank supervision is to enhance the safety and soundness of 
the banking system (Friesen 1986; Snoek 1989). While supervision has to be adequate, 
however, it should not impede competition. Inappropriate supervision— whether 
inadequate or excessive— leads to problems in banking.
Enforcement of the bank supervision measures was hindered by several 
problems. Inadequate accounting standards represented a major difficulty. Accounting 
standardisation of banks is necessary to simplify the supervision of banks. Another 
problem was inadequate staff, in terms of its number as well as experience, to inspect the 
soundness of banks (Bank Indonesia has recruited skilled and experienced inspectors 
more recently from abroad).
The government implicitly and explicitly guaranteed bank deposits as well as 
bank loans, and protected depositors directly and indirectly. This led to 'moral hazard' 
problems. In the mid-80s, Bank Indonesia helped several private banks (Bank 
Perkembangan Asia, Bank Wanita Mataram and Bank Angkasa Pura), that experienced 
solvency problems. At the end of 1990 the government helped another bank (Bank Duta) 
which experienced large losses from speculation in the foreign exchange market. 
Recently Bank Indonesia has been arranging bank mergers to prevent banks from failing. 
The government will not permit its banks (the seven state banks, including the state 
saving bank and Export Import bank) to fail.
Until the liquidation of Bank Summa in December 1992, however, government 
support of the banking system in Indonesia was such that banks rarely suffered the 
consequences of poor lending. As the Chilean and Argentinean experiences in the 1970s 
and the American banking experience in the 1980s and 1990s attest, such deposit 
insurance, if incorrectly priced, creates potentially severe problems of moral hazard 
within the banking system itself (Kane 1985). McKinnon (1988:407) argued that under 
these circumstances, banks have little to lose by making very risky loans at high real
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interest rates, because they are the beneficiaries of an unfair bet against the government. 
McKinnon (1993:89-90) claimed that the very risky loans at unnaturally high real interest 
rates are taken under the twin assumptions that (1) favorable outcomes, where the 
nonbank borrowers succeed in repaying their high-interest loans, will lead to large profits 
for the bank's shareholders; whereas (2) unfavorable outcomes, with highly correlated 
defaults among the nonbank borrowers leading to massive losses by the bank in question 
(and perhaps even the banking system as a whole), will be mainly borne by the monetary 
authority. Even though the bank owners might lose their equity or ownership claims with 
unfavorable outcomes, most of the losses will be covered by the deposit-insuring agency. 
Banks get to keep extraordinary profits without having to pay the full social costs of 
unusually large losses from risky lending.
Without adequate supervision of banks, 'distress borrowing' from banks by 
nonfinancial enterprises can contribute to maintaining high real interest rates. Many large 
corporations are highly leveraged (Nasution 1992b). They use new credits to pay old 
debts. High levels of debt financing lead to 'distress borrowing' from banks, with high 
interest rates reflecting the riskiness of the loans. But high interest rates reduce 
repayment prospects and accelerate defaults. Inadequate analysis and experience could 
lead the banks, in the hope of avoiding losses, to continue to provide funds (at high real 
interest rates), particularly during the boom years. It should be noted, however, that the 
government has put enormous efforts in bank supervision especially after 1993. These 
include an addition of one managing director in charge of bank supervision, 
reorganisation of banking departments to combine on-site and off-site bank supervision, 
and an advancement of human resource developments and recruitments.
Generally it might be in the national interest for some banks to undertake risky 
projects, for example in oil and mineral exploration. If all banks have a no-risk policy, it 
might negatively affect the growth rate of the Indonesian economy. However, there 
needs to be banking staff that are skilled in managing risks. It is undesirable if banks take 
on excessive risk as a result of factors such as: the presence of a 'bail-out' system by the 
government, high price volatility in financial markets, unhealthy competition among 
banks as well as from non-banks, and lack of professionalism in banking management. It
40
is argued that the state banks were often induced to finance risky projects because of the 
close relationship between the owners of the projects and high-ranking government 
officials. It is also argued that there was insufficient collateral in loan contracts, which 
made banks vulnerable to loan default.
The above behaviour of banks is reinforced by their ownership structure. Most 
major private banks in Indonesia are owned by business groups. Often these are family 
groups. A large part of the banks' loans flowed into intra group projects. Data are 
lacking, but the concentration of loans to relatively few borrowers is well known. Banks 
did not necessarily lend to projects on the basis of credit worthiness and business 
prospects, and might not have acted prudentially in spreading their credit risks. When 
borrowers' business slowed and they started facing difficulties in paying interest on loans, 
banks became burdened by high non-performing loans, but often continued to provide 
credits at high real interest rates.
Lack of professionalism on the part of both bankers and owners exacerbated 
banking conditions. Rapid expansion of the number of banks and bank offices created 
tremendous demand for skilled bankers which could not be met by the existing 
professional bankers. The increased competition in banking, especially after the October 
1988 deregulation, led many bankers to aggressively expand their businesses without 
adhering to the principles of prudential banking. The problems were further aggravated 
by pressure from the owners of the banks to lend to their associated businesses (or 
groups of business as described in earlier section) — a deviation from the legal lending 
rule. Such aggressive behaviour of banks increased bank margins in 1992 and 1993 as 
discussed on page 30.
It is also believed that there was a lack of understanding among bankers, of the 
macroeconomic consequences of their banking activities. The dominant role of the 
banking industry in the Indonesian financial sector caused the rapid expansion of bank 
businesses to have enormous effects on aggregate demand and hence on the maintenance 
of macroeconomic stability. This was the situation in the period of 1988 to 1990, in 
which rapid expansion of banking led to an overheating economy. Monetary authorities 
reacted by tightening the supply of money, which squeezed the liquidity of banks and
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raised interest rates. It is also possible that the lack of professionalism among bankers led 
them to not fully take into account this possibility of a down-turn in economic activities 
in the period of the banking 'boom' of the p o st-1988 banking deregulation.
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter argues that a thin money market and expectations of exchange rate 
instability in Indonesia led to high and volatile interest rates. The implicit and explicit 
guarantees on bank deposits (and loans), together with inadequate supervision, generated 
inefficiencies and moral hazard in banking which worsened the quality of bank assets. As 
a result real interest rates were high and non-performing loans mounted. Several other 
possible factors which might cause the high interest rates and high non-performing loans, 
such as the highly leveraged corporations and the close ties between banks and 
businesses, were also identified.
The next chapter discusses a review of the theoretical literature relating to 
financial deregulation. It also presents several studies on experiences of other countries 
in deregulating their financial sector. It then shows the difficulties in Indonesian banking 
after deregulation in the context of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model. It discusses the 
background to the model of the commercial banking sector that will be constructed in 
Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
Financial deregulation: a theoretical review
Introduction
Ever since it became widely recognised that finance does matter in economic growth, the 
management of financial intermediaries to achieve an optimal role in economic 
development has remained an important issue.1 Numerous theoretical and empirical 
works have been conducted to identify the advantages and disadvantages of a tightly 
regulated financial system for economic growth. Other studies have attempted to show 
the positive effects of a deregulated financial system on the efficient allocation of 
financial resources in the economy, and hence on growth. Most recent studies have 
questioned the feasibility of having unregulated free market competition in a financial 
system.
4.1. Theories of a regulated financial system
In the 1960s, many economists believed that financial intermediaries had to be strictly 
regulated to allow for the full effectiveness of monetary policy in economic management. 
This theory was motivated by the argument that monetary policy was the key instrument 
in promoting growth. The Chicago monetarists such as Mundell (1965) and Tobin 
(1965), for example, argued that an expansionary monetary policy was required to keep 
real interest rates at relatively low levels, thereby promoting capital formation and 
economic growth. This was so because they maintained a perfect foresight assumption, 
i.e. the actual inflation was equal to the expected inflation, and they also assumed that 
real cash balances and physical capital were substitutes in wealth holders' portfolios. An 
expansionary monetary policy would push up the expected rate of inflation, reduce real
'Many studies supported the hypothesis that money has non-neutral effects on output. Several of them 
are: Barro (1977, 1978); Brillembourg and Khan (1979); Barro and Rush (1980); Mishkin (1982, 1983); 
Cecchetti (1986); Friedman and Schwartz (1986); Gochoco (1986); Manchester (1989); Spencer (1989).
deposit rates of interest, shift people's portfolio from holding money to physical capital, 
and hence raise economic growth. The theory also suggested that subjecting financial 
intermediaries to interest rate ceilings would help increase physical investment. Monetary 
growth rules, therefore, can only be implemented in a regulated financial system. Hence 
the monetarists, although supporting some financial deregulation, opposed free banking.
A study by the neo-Keynesians, Tobin and Brainard (1967), who examined the 
effectiveness of monetary controls in the presence of financial intermediaries, supported 
the above argument. Using general equilibrium models in financial and capital markets, 
they concluded that monetary controls through the supply of currency in the presence of 
financial intermediaries affected the real economy. They also argued that regulations that 
prevented expansion of the intermediaries, such as reserve requirements and interest rate 
ceilings, strengthened monetary controls. Consequently, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy depended upon the effectiveness of the controls over the expansion of the financial 
intermediaries. The more effective these controls, the more effective the monetary policy.
All the above theories, however, did not discuss the role of the financial system in 
intermediating funds between savers and investors. Perhaps this was because it was 
assumed that savers and borrowers were the same people. As a consequence, it was 
believed that holding monetary assets inhibited investment. Therefore, a repressed 
financial system was a necessary condition for economic growth.
Goldsmith (1969) pioneered a different school of thought on the role of the 
financial sector in economic growth. Although he did not specify the causal mechanism 
or how the financial sector affected the real sector, he clearly suggested that the size and 
the complexity of the financial superstructure grew as real income and wealth increased. 
He noted that financial development was very important for economic growth, and that 
the effects of financial deregulation on growth would rest upon its impact on the 
efficiency of investment:
...there is no doubt that it [the development of financial sector] results in a 
different allocation of capital expenditures among and within sectors, types of 
tangible assets, and regions (:398).
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In the Goldsmith framework, both growth and financial intermediation were thought of 
as endogenous. He claimed that the process of growth had feedback effects on financial 
markets by creating incentives for further financial development.
4.2. Theories of a liberalised financial system
The case for deregulating the financial system had never been strong until the 
beginning of the 1970s when Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) explored its function as 
a financial intermediary between savers and borrowers. Both authors reversed several 
assumptions of the Chicago monetarist and neo-Keynesian views and, consequently, 
proposed different conclusions.
In general, it was argued that the monetary system has two functions. One is to 
supply the appropriate stock and rate of growth of real balances, and the other is to 
intermediate, allocating the savings between alternative investments in physical capital. 
The second function of a monetary system makes the Shaw and McKinnon views very 
distinct from the Chicago monetarists and neo-Keynesians. Monetary deepening is not at 
the expense of capital deepening as the latter believed.
The 'debt intermediation' view of Shaw (1973) treats real cash balances as a debt 
(i.e. liabilities of banks), associated with capital accumulation on the asset side of the 
economy's aggregate balance sheet. Real cash balances are an important repository for 
savings that should be transmuted into productive new investments. When interest rates 
are administratively fixed below their equilibrium level, financial intermediation is not 
optimal and the allocation of investible funds is not efficient. A higher real interest rate 
will raise the incentive to save in financial forms, and increase the efficiency of 
investment. Financial intermediation is optimal when the interest rates are allowed to find 
their equilibrium level free from other regulations. If the optimal condition is achieved, 
the real costs to investors are lowered by accommodating liquidity preference, lowering 
information costs to savers and investors, increasing operational efficiency, and reducing 
risk through diversification. Overall, a more efficient allocation of investible funds 
together with more efficient investments, results in higher economic growth.
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McKinnon's 'complementarity' hypothesis assumes that real money balances and 
physical capital are complements (arising from the nature of the economies of developing 
countries) rather than substitutes. This assumption implies that if the desired rate of 
capital accumulation (and hence private saving) increases at any given level of income, 
the average ratio of real cash balances to income will also increase. McKinnon also 
assumes that all economic units are confined to self finance and that investments are 
indivisible. Potential investors must accumulate money balances prior to their 
investments. The more attractive the process of accumulating money, i.e. the higher the 
real deposit rate of interest, the greater the incentive to invest. If the real return on 
holding money increases, so will self-financed investment over a significant range of 
investment opportunities. This is the 'conduit' effect of money. If the desirability of 
holding cash balances increases, the opportunity cost of saving internally for the eventual 
purchase of capital goods from outside the firm-household is reduced. McKinnon's 
hypothesis suggests that real deposit rates are the key element to induce investment. In 
repressed financial economies, where interest rates are set below their equilibrium level, 
incentives to invest are reduced, therefore, economic growth is inhibited.
Both Shaw and McKinnon favour financial deregulation, i.e. removing ceilings on 
interest rates, as a means of promoting economic growth. The focus of Shaw and 
McKinnon is on the effects of developments and policies regarding financial markets on 
savings and investments. The removal of financial repression not only will induce a 
higher savings rate, and hence a higher volume of investments and growth, but also 
higher productivity of capital.
The financial system and stabilisation models of Shaw and McKinnon have been 
developed further. These models have been formalised mathematically, extended to open 
economies in order to analyse exchange rate policies, and tested empirically. The 
extended models, including those of Kapur (1974, 1976), Galbis (1977), Fry (1978, 
1980) and Mathieson (1980), are known as 'disequilibrium models' because they are 
models for developing countries in which disequilibrium is pervasive throughout the 
economies.
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All the models are built on the premise that financial repression inhibits economic 
growth. Liberalising the financial system from restrictions is very important in helping the 
economy to mobilise savings, attract foreign capital and improve efficiency in the use of 
financial resources. Financial liberalisation is growth promoting.
4 . 3 . Studies on financial deregulation
Theories in favour of financial deregulation or liberalisation are very convincing. During 
the 1970s and 1980s many countries, both developed and developing, adopted financial 
deregulation. Many others are still in the process of deregulation. In most of the 
developing countries, financial deregulation resulted in positive real interest rates. Galbis 
(1993) reports that 18 developing countries that freed their interest rate controls in the 
1970s and 1980s managed to achieve positive real interest rates. In fact these countries 
experienced consistently high positive real interest rates, around three or more 
percentage points in real terms. All 18 countries experienced highly negative real interest 
rates before undertaking financial deregulation.
In the mid-1980s, concerns arose about the possible detrimental effects of high 
real interest rates under financial deregulation (Diaz-Alejandro 1985; Galbis 1987). It 
was widely agreed that high real interest rates could be efficient if they reflected a high 
rate of return on investments. High real interest rates, however, could be undesirable if 
they were the results of unfavourable micro and macroeconomic conditions such as for 
example, unabating inflationary expectations, anticipated exchange rate changes, 
stringent monetary policy without adequate fiscal consolidation and lack of credibility of 
economic policies (Calvo 1988; Calvo and Guidotti 1991; Guidotti and Kumar 1991). It 
also included other factors such as a fragile financial structure, poor supervisory 
environment which led to moral hazard in financial institutions and lack of a proper legal 
framework to safeguard property rights (Calvo and Coricelli 1991).
Regarding the efficiency gains of financial deregulation, many studies have been 
conducted on the relationship between positive real interest rates and savings in 
developing countries, on both time series and cross section estimates (Fry 1978, 1980;
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Fry and Mason 1982; Yusuf and Peters 1984; Gupta 1984; Giovannini 1985; de Melo 
and Tybout 1986; Leite and Makonnen 1986; Khatkhate 1988; Balassa 1989a; the World 
Bank 1989; Dornbusch 1990). These studies conclude that there is no clear relationship 
between positive real interest rates and savings in developing countries. Positive real 
interest rates, however, lead to a shift from non financial to financial savings.
Following Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), numerous 
studies have dealt with different aspects of the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. Recently, this relationship has been incorporated 
into the 'endogenous growth' models, such as those proposed by Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) and Bencivenga and Smith (1991). While the positive relationship 
between financial development indicators and growth has been supported empirically 
(Fry 1988; the World Bank 1989; Gelb 1989; Polak 1989; Easterly 1990; Khan and 
Villanueva 1991), the channel of transmission from financial development to growth 
remains a controversy. The controversy hinges upon whether the effect of financial 
intermediation on growth is due mainly to its impact on the productivity of investment 
(Goldsmith 1969) or the volume of investment (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973).
Recently many studies have found that the efficiency of investment, rather than its 
volume, is the main channel of transmission from financial development to growth 
(Diaz-Alejandro 1985; Levine 1992; Saint-Paul 1992; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1992; 
de Gregorio 1992; Jappelli and Pagano 1992; de Gregorio and Guidotti 1992).
Large numbers of studies have also concentrated on identifying the possible 
causes of failures in financial deregulation several developing countries, especially in 
Latin America, and contrasting them with the success of deregulation attempts in the 
Asian countries. Corbo and de Melo (1985) report that Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay 
experienced severe macroeconomic imbalances, characterised by high inflation rate and 
large fiscal and current account deficits, when financial deregulation was first 
implemented. Chile experienced serious policy mistakes in 1973-1975. In May 1974, it 
started a gradual liberalisation of its interest rate. Fortunately, soon after interest rate 
liberalisation was completed in April 1975, Chile became less subject to macroeconomic 
instability and further financial crisis. Argentina and Uruguay were less fortunate. For
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several years, their macroeconomic instabilities worsened following the financial 
deregulation attempts. Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia, among the Asian 
countries, were successful in avoiding any adverse consequences from the deregulation, 
such as a sharp increase in real interest rates and bankruptcies of firms (Cho and 
Khatkhate 1989; Yang 1990; Shea 1990; Atiyas 1989).
It is widely accepted that macroeconomic stability is a necessary condition for 
financial deregulation. McKinnon (1982) convincingly shows that fiscal instability in 
Chile during the period 1973-1975 and in Argentina especially before 1976 is responsible 
for the failure of financial deregulation. Domestic price stability, which is partly a 
consequence of fiscal discipline, is the key element for the success of financial 
deregulation in Korea and Taiwan (see McKinnon 1991), Yang (1990), and Shea (1990). 
Villanueva and Mirakhor (1990) also show that macroeconomic stability is very 
important in the initial stage of financial deregulation, as are effective bank supervision 
and an appropriate sequencing of stabilisation.
Several other factors which contribute to the failure of financial deregulation are 
identified, such as the absence of well-functioning equity markets (Cho 1986), and 
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers which leads to 'adverse risk 
selection' and 'adverse incentive' (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Villanueva and Mirakhor 
(1990) use the Stiglitz and Weiss assumptions to incorporate a macroeconomic instability 
problem into their argument. Macroeconomic instability is a situation in which large 
changes in the price of goods and factors of production lead to increased variance and 
positive covariances in project returns.
They argue that with the presence of macroeconomic instability, the government 
may require higher reserves against defaults which would lower the expected profit 
function of the bank at any given loan interest rate. The higher variance in project return 
increases adverse risk selection and lowers the optimal loan interest rate. The lower is the 
loan interest rate, the more severe is the credit rationing. Hence, macroeconomic 
instability would reinforce asymmetric information effects on the loan market.
The right sequencing of economic reform is also recognised as the main element 
of the success of financial deregulation. McKinnon (1982) and Edwards (1984) are the
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main contributors in this issue. According to them, financial deregulation should take 
place after the public finances or the fiscal deficit finances are brought under control. 
This is so because financial repression is necessary to finance government budget deficits 
(see the inflation tax issue in the World Development Report, 1989). Exchange controls 
are required to prevent capital outflows resulting from the domestically repressed 
financial system.
After the fiscal deficit is under control, interest rates can be raised to get positive 
rates which are necessary to mobilise saving. Coincidentally with the fiscal improvement 
and deregulation of domestic finance, the current account of the balance of payments 
should be liberalised. Again exchange controls must be implemented to avoid massive 
capital inflow which will hurt the competitiveness of tradeable goods in the international 
market. Only after those three elements, fiscal stabilisation, financial deregulation, and 
current account liberalisation, are well underway, can the capital account be liberalised 
and a flexible exchange rate adopted.
Therefore, as Edwards stresses, exchange controls should only be lifted after the 
domestic financial markets have been reformed and domestic interest rates have been 
raised. In turn, interest rates can be raised only after the fiscal deficit is under control. He 
also says that it is more prudent to liberalise the current account before relaxing capital 
controls. This suggestion is also supported by Krueger (1983) and Frenkel (1982) who 
suggest that trade liberalisation prior to the opening of the capital account is preferable 
on welfare grounds.
Recent studies, however, indicate that there is no clear agreement on the 
sequencing of economic reform (Cole and Slade 1990a; Leung 1991; Woo 1991; Park 
1991). Park in particular, contends that the McKinnon argument that domestic financial 
deregulation should precede the liberalisation of current account transactions should be 
reversed. He proposes that trade-first liberalisation may be safer, and hence preferable. 
Although domestic financial markets will adjust promptly to new arrangements induced 
by domestic financial deregulation, the commodity market will send out wrong relative 
price signals and will induce real investments in the wrong industries if the current 
account remains regulated. A liberalised domestic financial market could exacerbate the
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wrong investment decision, because now firms with artificially good prospects brought 
about by trade restrictions may be able to borrow more easily than before. Park, 
however, is also aware that a repressed financial system could undermine the correct 
relative price signals resulting from a liberalised current account. Under such a system, 
the expected movement of resources to the sectors with the highest rates of return to 
capital could not be guaranteed, thereby negating the benefits of freer trade.
The southern cone experiences of financial deregulation in the 1970s in 
particular, continuously attract economists' attention. Besides several reasons mentioned 
above, many studies find that the undisciplined behaviour of financial intermediaries 
which do not always intermediate between savers and investors, contribute to the 
unsuccessful financial deregulation in this area. Financial intermediaries often transfer net 
savings of one group to finance consumption of other groups. Park (1991), Harberger 
(1984), Hanson and de Melo (1985) find that in all three countries, the financial 
intermediaries were active in financing the purchases of imported consumer durables by 
making credit available for such purchases. Diaz-Alejandro (1985), Harberger (1984) 
and Corbo and de Melo (1985), conclude that this undisciplined behaviour of financial 
intermediaries was critical in bringing down the entire liberalisation program.
The moral hazard problem is also pointed out as another factor which inhibits 
financial deregulation. The explicit and implicit guarantees by the government of the 
insolvent banks in taking over their bad debts lead domestic firms to overborrow. They 
also lead the banks to not lend on the basis of credit worthiness. This results in the 
accumulation of bad loans (see Park 1991).
All things considered, it appears that partial financial deregulation is preferable to 
complete deregulation. Indeed, this is the remaining debate over financial deregulation in 
developing countries. McKinnon (1986, 1989) has modified his earlier proposition. He 
suggests that perhaps the government should impose a ceiling on standard loan (and 
deposit) rates of interest in order to overcome the banks' moral hazard problem. 
However, he still holds macroeconomic instability as the main cause of financial 
deregulation failure.
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4 .4 . Moral hazard and high real interest rates in Indonesian banking 
post-deregulation
The Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model of credit rationing in markets with imperfect 
information shows that an efficient bank would rather ration credit than increase loan 
interest rates when there is excess demand for funds. This credit rationing equilibrium 
exists even in a competitive banking system. Extending the Stiglitz and Weiss model this 
section shows that in the presence of moral hazard, high exchange rate risk, a thin money 
market and the other problems discussed above, relatively high interest rates result. The 
Stiglitz and Weiss model assumes asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers in the loan market. Asymmetric information is defined as a situation in which 
borrowers have greater information about their own default risks than do lenders. 
Lenders can only obtain imperfect information about the default risks. (The model is 
summarised in Appendix 4.A).
Because of imperfect information interest rates and bank charges have an impact 
on the riskiness of the pool of loans through two channels. They are the adverse selection 
channel for sorting potential borrowers, and the adverse incentive channel for changing 
the actions of borrowers.
Since the expected return to the bank depends on the probability of loan 
repayment, which differs across borrowers, the bank needs to have screening devices to 
identify borrowers who are more likely to repay. Stiglitz and Weiss claim that the interest 
rate which an individual is willing to pay may act as a screening device; the higher the 
interest rate borrowers are willing to pay, the worse the risks, because borrowers 
perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be low. An increase in the interest rate 
will screen out safer borrowers who have a higher probability of repaying the loan. The 
average riskiness of the bank's assets rises. Beyond a certain point, this would lower the 
bank's profits. This provides the rationale for a credit rationing equilibrium.
The interest rate may also change the behaviour of borrowers. The relative 
attractiveness of riskier projects increases. Borrowers tend to prefer riskier projects 
which have higher returns but greater variance, over safer projects which have lower
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returns but smaller variance (the greater the variance, the greater the risk). Banks 
therefore have another incentive to ration credit, rather than raise the interest rate when 
there is excess demand for loanable funds.
Stiglitz and Weiss also assume that banks behave efficiently, and that there is no 
moral hazard problem in banking, that is, deposit insurance is correctly priced with 
adequate (internal and external) supervision of banks so that moral hazard is not a 
problem amongst the banks themselves.
Figure 4.1 Credit rationing equilibrium
The adverse selection and incentive effects lead to a credit rationing equilibrium 
as illustrated in Figure 4.1. In the upper right quadrant, the demand for loans L^ depends 
on the interest rate charged by bank r. It is a decreasing function of r. The supply of 
funds Ls depends on p , the expected return to the bank per dollar loaned. If banks are 
free to compete for depositors, then p will be the interest rate received by depositors, 
abstracting from operating costs, etc. The loan interest rate r can affect the supply of 
funds through its impact on the return on each loan, hence on the interest rate (p) the 
bank can offer to attract loanable funds.
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The lower right quadrant depicts the relationship between the loan interest rate r 
and the expected return to the bank (p). p is a nonmonotonic function of r because as 
the loan interest rate increases, the riskiness of loans increases. Beyond a point, this will 
cause the return to the bank to decrease. The relationship between Ls and p is 
illustrated in the lower left quadrant.2 And a forty five degree line is drawn in the upper 
left quadrant.
The adverse selection and incentive effects lead to the proposition that there must 
be a certain loan interest rate level, an equilibrium loan interest rate r*, which will 
maximise the bank's expected return. Below this level, the supply of loanable funds Ls is 
a positive function of the loan interest rate. Also, the expected return to the bank p 
increases as interest rate increases. Increases in the loan interest rate above r* would 
produce (excessive) adverse selection and adverse incentive effects, i.e. borrowers with 
high repayment probabilities withdraw and are replaced by those with high default risks. 
These effects would reduce the expected return to the bank, so that beyond r* p is 
negatively related to r because the repayment probability declines by more than the 
increase in the interest rate.
At r*, the expected return to the bank is maximised. There may be an excess 
demand for loans if r* is lower than the market clearing rate, which is likely to happen. It 
follows that at this level of loan interest rates, credit rationing would occur. Therefore, 
r* is the credit rationing equilibrium corresponding to the bank's expected return of p v. 
This equilibrium exists even in competitive banking markets, r171 is the Walrasian 
equilibrium loan interest rate but not the equilibrium rate optimal to the bank, i.e., at r* 
the bank could get higher expected return and attract at least all the borrowers attracted 
at rm .
Thus far, it is assumed that banks behave efficiently and there are no moral 
hazard problems in banking. If these assumptions are relaxed, the Stiglitz and Weiss 
results will be affected. Moral hazard problems in banking, that is, the perception that the 
central bank would bail out banks in difficult times, will affect the credit rationing
-L $  and p is not necessarily an increasing function even in an open economy because of many 
kinds of risks.
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equilibrium through two channels: through its effect on the expected return to the bank 
p , and through the nonmonotonicity between p and the loan interest rate r.
The expected return to the bank will no longer vary with the riskiness of the loan 
that is reflected in the riskiness of the borrowers or their project returns (R) since the 
government guarantees the consequences of default for depositors (Equation 6 Appendix 
4.A). Assuming that risk of default to shareholders can be ignored, i.e. highly 
competitive banking without adequate supervision, the return to the bank is dependent 
solely on the interest rate. The close ties in ownership between banks and businesses tend 
to encourage the banks to lend regardless of the riskiness of the project so long as the 
consequences of default for depositors is guaranteed. Since the bank is not concerned 
about adverse selection and incentive effects, it will raise the loan interest rate as long as 
there is an excess demand for loanable funds. The bank will continue raising the rate until 
demand equals supply of funds.3 Hence, up to this point there is a monotonic relationship 
between the expected return to the bank and the loan interest rate.
This situation is illustrated in the lower right quadrant of Figure 4.2. KK 
represents the new relationship between p and r, with p as an increasing function of r 
until point E at the loan interest rate nn (when demand equals supply of funds). Unlike 
Stiglitz and Weiss, the loan interest rate would not stop at r* when excess demand for 
funds exists. The supply of loans will actually increase with r. Ls is the new supply of 
loanable funds, r* is the Walrasian equilibrium loan interest rate, and corresponds now to 
the optimising equilibrium rate for the bank. Em and rm are the Stiglitz and Weiss 
Walrasian equilibrium.
Several other (exogenous) factors may increase loan interest rates. A thin money 
market and high exchange rate risks cause volatility of interest rates and increase the 
long-term cost of funds. In the presence of these factors, the expected return to banks 
would be lowered since operating costs increase. Therefore, to achieve the same level of
3The absence of credit rationing after financial deregulation is not tested empirically here. A study 
by Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1992), however, supported the argument that there was no 
rationing for credits to the manufacturing sector in Indonesia post-deregulation. These types of 
credits accounted for 33 per cent of the total credits in Indonesian banking.
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bank returns as when these factors are absent, the bank has to raise the current loan
interest rate.
The effect is indicated by the shift of the bank's expected return curve, KK, to the 
right and towards the r axis, to the new curve K'K'. At the equilibrium r'm the expected 
return will decrease from p, to p , . The bank makes more loans at a riskier level of loan 
interest rate. Distress borrowing and close ties of ownership between banks and business 
help maintain the high level of interest rates.
Figure 4.2 Credit rationing equilibrium with moral hazard problems and 
inefficiencies in banking
Em E
The above modified (moral hazard) version of the Stiglitz and Weiss model 
suggests that bank interest rate margins would widen. Comparing the data in Tables 3.1 
and 3.2 (Chapter 3), average bank net margins rose significantly from 1991 to 1993, 
after they continuously fell from 1986 to 1991. This is consistent with the description in 
section 4.4 above of Indonesian banking during crisis from 1990 onwards.
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4.5 . Conclusion
The widespread bankruptcies in financial sectors of both developed and developing 
countries in the 1980s led to renewed interest in the stability of banking competition and 
the government's role in this sector. Park (1991) agrees with the McKinnon assumption 
that in developing countries, money is the most attractive instrument of private wealth 
accumulation because it is a means of payment sanctioned by the state. Financial 
instruments other than money cannot be easily marketed, because lenders know little or 
nothing about either the honesty or the repayment capability of potential borrowers in 
developing economies (informational asymmetries).
Liberal reform, according to Park, will not make the marketing of non-monetary 
financial assets easier than before, but it could impair the viability of the payments system 
and will reduce the value of deposits as an attractive financial instrument. Greenbaum 
and Higgins (1983) and Friedman (1985) suggest that in the presence of asymmetric 
information, the role of government becomes necessary to reduce the problems of 
observability, breaches of contract and moral hazard. The financial system must be built 
on confidence in the integrity of both financial instruments and institutions, and trust that 
financial contracts will be honoured and that a legal framework exists for their 
enforcement. The confidence needed to resolve informational asymmetry is a public 
good, and the role of financial regulation is to provide that public good.
A number of theoretical models on the subject have been constructed, 
questioning the stability of free banking and the purpose served by central banking and 
financial regulation (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Smith 1984; Anderlini 1986; Freeman 
1988). They claim that because depositors' liquidity demands are uncertain and banks' 
assets are less liquid than their liabilities, banking instability arises. They suggest that this 
instability justifies government involvement in banking.
On the part of commercial banks, several issues related to their behaviour in the 
new competitive, market-oriented environment should also be noted. Lack of 
professionalism on the part of both bankers and owners, as well as poor management of 
risks, were likely to be the two most important factors which contributed to the failure of
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financial deregulation. The business of banking is the business of managing risk. Prior to 
the 1970s, banks were either heavily regulated or comfortably cartelised. Bankers 
worked in a stable and cosy environment. Since the early 1970s however, deregulation, 
new technology and volatile markets in response to increased competition — among 
banks as well as from non-banks— have made banking a much riskier business. 
Well-trained bankers, who are able to foresee the volatility of future income and how it 
affects the value of the firm, are needed. The objective of risk management, therefore, is 
not to make banking risk free, but rather to minimise losses to banks.
If efficiency gains from financial deregulation are unquestionable, and therefore 
deregulation should continue, the central question is, should the central bank's provision 
of de facto  loan guarantees be continued or would it be simpler just to abandon this 
practice? As shown in this chapter, in a poor supervisory environment, deposit 
guarantees by the government may lead to moral hazard problems in banking. Would it 
be feasible to have free market competition in banking with no central bank guarantees 
or "lender of last resort" activity? Starting from discussion on these particular questions, 
the next chapter devises a scheme of loan insurance to overcome the moral hazard 
problem. The model modifies the risk-sharing and incentive contract theory to construct 
an optimal risk-sharing relationship between commercial banks and central bank in the 
form of loan insurance.
58
C hapter 5
M odels of state loan insurance
Introduction
Whilst it is recognised that many traditional regulations of the financial sector are 
damaging to economic growth and therefore should be removed on efficiency grounds, 
the extent and ways in which government intervention should occur in the financial 
sector are by no means settled. Friedman and Schwartz (1986) question the feasibility of 
free banking. They say that the market itself will not be able to provide a stable financial 
system. Tobin (1985) stressed that the use of a common monetary unit of account and 
the adoption of a generally acceptable medium of exchange in this numeraire carry 
positive externalities. Free market competition by itself cannot achieve and protect these 
externalities. Therefore, financial deregulation must be sought in ways that do not impair 
the payments system or subject it to interruptions and breakdowns.
Park (1991) similarly argued that as long as the government authority retains the 
deposit-insurance system and lender-of-last-resort function, a full scale financial 
deregulation will most likely produce serious moral hazard and other problems. Chapters 
3 and 4 have shown how moral hazard and other problems in Indonesian banking led to 
relatively high real interest rates and high non-performing loans. Without these 
functions, however, the safety of the payments system under financial deregulation is in 
danger. The unavoidable trade off between efficiency gains and safety of the payments 
system associated with financial deregulation may explain why the success of partial 
deregulation does not ensure a similar success in full scale liberalisation efforts.
This chapter argues that the trade off between efficiency gains and safety of the 
payments system can be greatly reduced if deposit insurance is correctly priced. The 
risks that are present in loan markets should be internalised and incorporated into the 
insurance structure. Asymmetric information would not necessarily entail moral hazard 
in banking.
This chapter models the central bank and commercial bank relationship in the 
context of loan insurance. It seeks answers to the question: what are the elements of an 
the optimal contract designed to alleviate moral hazard problems in banking associated 
with deposit guarantees by central banks? The model is a modification and an application 
of risk-sharing and incentive contract theories that were used extensively in designing 
optimal contracts for principal-agent relationship by, among others, Harris and Raviv 
(1976), Mirrlees (1974, 1976), Holmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979), Fried and Howitt 
(1980), and Osano and Tsutsui (1985). The approach is known as the 'standard' method 
or the 'first-order' approach for analysing the principal-agent problem.
The model is then extended by relaxing several restrictive assumptions used in 
the first-order approach. The extended model applies the 'uncertainty' approach 
proposed by Grossman and Hart (1983), and Chambers and Quiggin (1992, 1993).
5.1. A model of commercial banking in the presence of moral hazard: 
the ’first-order’ approach
Let the principal be the central bank and the agent be the commercial bank (the bank). 
The bank takes an action a e  A, A being the set of all possible actions, a can be 
interpreted as a nonmonetary phenomenon that have a monetary equivalent, (e.g., 
prudential behaviour of the bank entails costs). It is assumed that a and a 'random state 
of nature' 0 determine a monetary outcome D = D(a,9). The outcome may be a default 
loan or a loss . D\a)  > 0, i.e. the more the bank behaves prudently, the smaller is the 
probability of a default or the smaller is the size of a default loan.
The central bank and the bank are each assumed to act so as to maximise 
expected utility. The central bank's utility function U{ *) is defined over wealth w, and 
the bank's utility function V(9 )is defined over wealth and action. U'(w) > 0, V(w) > 0, 
U" < 0, and V\W) < 0. This implies that the central bank is less risk averse or indeed, is
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risk neutral, and the commercial bank is risk averse.1 Both U and V are strictly increasing 
and continuously differentiable in w. V( *) is separable, V(w,a) = v(vv) - h(a) ; V(a) < 0.
The outcome D is assumed to be a random variable with a distribution F{D,a). 
Given the distribution of 0 , F(D,a) is the distribution induced on D via the relationship 
D = D(a,Q) (Mirrlees 1974,1976), Da > 0 and Fa < 0. F is assumed to have a 
probability density function (or a distribution mass) /(D ,a) — a probability function of D 
given a— with f a and f aa well defined for all (D,a) (Holmstrom 1979). The central bank 
may or may not have imperfect information about the bank's action. The problem is 
seeking the optimal sharing rules of the outcome and how to make the optimal rules 
enforceable. The model also assumes that the premium is set on the basis of an 
'actuarially fair' contract (Kreps 1990:91-93) as explained in Appendix 5.A.
(i) Central bank can only observe the outcome. The central bank has no 
information about the bank's action. Therefore, the sharing rules have to be functions of 
the outcome D alone, that is 0= 0  (D). Let 0(D) be the share of outcome that goes to 
the bank and D-0(D) be the share that goes to the central bank. Given <j) = 0(D) the 
bank maximises expected utility over a :
E V ( M  = J V«(>(D),a))f(D,a)dD (1)
where E denotes the expectation operator. The expected utility of the central bank is:
EU(<$>,a) = jU(D-<S>(D))f(D,a)dD (2)
The constrained Pareto-optimal sharing rules 0(D) are obtained by solving the 
maximisation problem
*An examiner commented that in practice, the situation is somewhat more complicated than the 
representation of banks as risk-averse decisionmakers suggests. Private banks have shareholders, and are 
run by risk-averse managers. The shareholders write optimal contracts to constrain the manager's 
behaviour, and the central bank designs optimal regulation to affect the manager's and owner's 
decisions. It is assumed that the utility function over profits induced for the managers by these contracts 
is risk-averse. For state banks, which have no shareholders other than the government, the model may 
be applied more directly to the managers utility function.
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max [ U( D -  (J) (D))f (  D, a )dD
9 m  •*
(3)
Subject to: J v(§(D))f(D,a)dD -  h(a) > V° (4)
and Jv(<J)(D))fu(D,a)dD = h'(a) (5)
where V° is the bank's reservation utility level determined by negotiation or market 
forces, i.e. the utility level the bank could achieve by not joining the scheme. Equation 
(4) is called the individual rationality or participation constraint to ensure the bank to 
take the contract and (5) is the incentive constraint to force the bank to choose the 
desired action. (5) indicates that the central bank can observe D but not a (Holmstrom 
1979; Mirrlees 1974,1976).
The solution of (3) subject to (4) is known as the first-best solution, which 
results in optimal risk sharing, as its solution describes a Pareto optimum when a and (J) 
can be directly chosen. This happens when the central bank can observe a accurately. 
The central bank thus can stipulate the highest (j) (since D is a loss or default loan) 
unless the bank chooses exactly the first-best level of efforts (Holmstrom 1979; Shavell 
1979). The solution of (3) subject to (4) and (5) is called the second-best solution, as a 
cannot be observed with complete accuracy or cannot be observed at all. To avoid 
nonexistence of a solution §{D)  is restricted to lie in an interval, i.e. [c, d+D] 
(Holmstrom 1979).
Another way of writing the maximisation problem of (3) subject to (4) and (5) is 
proposed by Kreps (1990:607-8). Let x(D) = v(<|)(D)) and let u be the inverse of v so 
that u(v($(D))  = (J)(D) or u( x(D)) = (j)(D). The expected share the central bank must 
give to the bank is
ju(x (D)) f (D,a)dD  (6)
and the expected utility of the bank is 
J x(D)f (D,  a)dD -  h(a) (7 )
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The maximisation problem can then be written as:
min f u(x(D))f(D,a)clD
X,U J
( 8 )
Subject to: j  x(D)f(D,a)dD -  h(a) > V° (9)
and j x ( D ) fa(D,a)dD = h \a) ( 1 0 )
The two maximisation problems will yield the same optimal sharing rules ({)(/)).
Let X be the multiplier of (4) and r| be the multiplier of (5). The optimal sharing 
rule of the Lagrangian pointwise optimisation will be characterised by:
v ' ( p - * m  = x u m
v'(<K D)) f(D,a)
for every D for which (11) has a solution (j)(D) e  [c,d+D], a is determined by (5) and 
r\ is given as the solution to the adjoint equation:
j  U(D -  0( D))/„ (D,a)dD + n{{ v(§(D))faa(D, a)dD -  /,"(«)} = 0
( 12)
Perfect risk sharing can only obtain if the right hand side of (11) is a constant or 
if Tj = 0  (Borch 1962). Holmstrom (1979), however, shows that if h ’(a) > 0 and Fa < 0, 
then r| > 0 or the central bank would like to see the bank increase its action towards 
increased prudence in lending given the second best sharing rule. §(D) must depend to 
an extent on the outcome D, and the bank never bears all the risk (Shavell 1979). 
Although the change in action will have no first-order effect on the bank's expected 
utility (by the Envelope theorem), it will increase the outcome in every state of nature 0 , 
thus allowing the central bank to reward the bank which increases its action and makes 
itself better off as well.
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If the bank's action only affects the probability of a default and not the size or the 
severity of a default, (j) will consist of only a deduction which is paid when a default 
occurs, and is independent of D , i.e., <\>(D) = -d where d is a deductible amount 
(Holmstrom 1979). If p{a) is the probability when a default occurs then 
f(D,a)=p(a).g(D), p \ a )< 0 and g(D) is a damage distribution independent of a. 
f a(D,a)/f(D,a) = p\a)/p{a)< 0 for when default occurs. Hence f a/ f  is independent of D. 
If the bank's action will also affect the severity (size) of default, the optimal sharing rule 
will depend on the outcome, i.e., §(D) -  -d - t(D), where t{D) is the bank's additional 
share in the costs of a default.
Following Holmstrom's arguments, \ f a\ / f  in (11) can be interpreted as a 
benefit-cost ratio for deviation from first-best risk sharing (when rj = 0) from the bank's 
point of view. If the marginal return from action f a(D,a) is positive (negative) to the 
bank, then the second-best sharing rule will be greater (smaller) than the first-best 
sharing rule. So the larger is \ f a \ the stronger is the incentive to deviate from optimal
risk sharing, and it is more costly the greater is /. The deviation from optimal risk 
sharing should be made in proportion to this ratio, with individual risk aversion taken 
into account.
From the central bank's point of view, f a/ f  may be interpreted as a measure of 
how strongly the central bank is inclined to infer from D that the bank did not take the 
assumed action, since f a/ f  is the derivative of the maximum likelihood function log / ,  
when a cannot be directly observed. Hence (11) says that penalties or bonuses should 
be paid in proportion to this measure.
(ii) The central bank knows the outcome and has imperfect information 
about the bank's action. If the bank's action cannot be observed, the commercial bank 
is forced (by the central bank) to carry excess responsibility for the outcome. The cost 
involved in deviating from the first-best sharing rule occurs regardless of whether the 
outcome or the deviation is generated fully by the bank's action or by factors beyond its 
control (Holmstrom 1979; Shavell 1979; Kreps 1990). Consequently, there are positive 
gains to observing the bank's action (Holmstrom 1979). Shavell (1979) shows that 
information about the bank's action is always of value.
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Let real loan interest rate bank charges r be the signal of the bank's action, r 
gives imperfect information about the bank's action but it can be observed directly. 
Unlike the Holmstrom assumption, r directly reflects the bank's action instead of the 
factors outside the bank's control. For example, if the default occurred fully because of 
the bank's action, r may take a value of one or r= l, and r= 0 otherwise. A high real loan 
interest rate, i.e. a positive by three or more percentage points in real terms (Galbis 
1993), indicates a less prudent bank. In this case, higher real rate of interest corresponds 
to higher probability of the outcome (default) or higher value of the default loans.
The sharing rule (}) would depend on the information r in addition to the 
outcome D, (j) = (j) (D,r). A default can be caused by the bank's action or by factors 
beyond the bank's control, for example, government policy, economic recession, or 
natural disaster. The bank would have the share of ({) (D,r) (or be partly responsible for 
the default loan) only if the real loan interest rate is higher than the 'standard' rate (more 
than positive three percentage points in real terms). By this arrangement, the bank would 
not have to carry the extra burden that exists when the bank's action cannot be observed 
at all.
Since r depends on a and the state of nature 0 , then the distribution of r depends 
on D as well as on a. Let q(r,D,a) be the distribution density function of r given D and 
a. The expected utility of the bank will be
EV($,a) = JJ V(ty(D,r),a))q(r,D,a)drf(D,a)dD (13)
The expected utility of the central bank is
EU(<\>,a) = j j  U(D-§(D,r))q(r,D,a)drf(D,a)dD (14)
The maximisation problem can be written as
max Jj U(D-<\){D,r))q(r, D,a)drf(D,a)dD (15)
Subject to: JJ v(<J\>(D,r))q(r,D,a)drf(D,a)dD-h(a)>V° (16)
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and jjv(<|)(D,r))qu(r,D,a)drfu(D,a)dD = h \ a ) (17)
The optimal sharing rule is characterised by
U ' ( D -  §(D,r)  = ^  | [ qa(r ,D,a)  | f a(D,a)  |
v'(ty(D,r)) { q(r , D, a)  f ( D , a ) J
As in section (i) \qa.fa \ / q f  can be seen as a benefit-cost ratio for the deviation 
from the optimal risk sharing rule. qa.falq*f also measures how strongly the central 
bank is inclined to infer from D that the bank did not take the assumed action. In this 
case, however, any change in r may change qa.fa/ q . f . Different contingencies (i.e. 
imprudent behaviour of the bank, government policy, etc.) signalled by r, will produce a 
different share 0 (D,r), given the same value of D. Given r, the central bank is inclined 
to infer less about a via D, and so the bank's share would be small. If, given r, the 
central bank cannot infer anything about a via D, or qaf a = 0, then the optimal sharing 
rule ({) (D,r) = 0 should be employed. Hence, the bank would not have to be responsible 
for any default loan. For example, the bank should only have to pay the deduction.
The optimisation problem of (13) subject to (14) and (15) is useful in identifying 
the types of contingencies. Does the default result from the bank's action or other 
factors? It is also useful to identify how much a particular signal r is responsible for a 
given outcome. The sharing rule would depend to some extent on r, represented by
q jq -
The 'first-order' approach, however, contains a strong constraint (and is one of 
its weaknesses) that the agent choose an action at which her/his utility is at a stationary 
point, i.e. the agent satisfies her/his first-order conditions with respect to the choice of 
action. The agent's second-order conditions, i.e. the condition that the agent should be 
at a global rather than a local maximum, are ignored. Mirrlees (1975) has shown that this 
method will be valid only if at the optimum, the solution to the agent's maximisation 
problem is unique. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to guarantee uniqueness in advance.
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Without uniqueness, necessary conditions for a contract to solve the first-order method 
are not generally even necessary conditions for the optimality of the risk-sharing 
contract. Grossman and Hart (1983) and Rogerson (1985) have shown this situation 
graphically in their papers.
Holmstrom (1984) has identified a class of problems where the first-order 
approach is valid. That is where the distribution function over outcomes is a convex 
combination of two fixed distribution functions and the agent's action determines the 
weights of the convex combination. Rogerson (1985) has also identified sufficient 
conditions — the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) condition and convexity of the 
distribution function (CDF) condition— for the first-order approach to be valid. He 
found that this approach is valid only when the marginal return from action is positive to 
the agent, which is against the economic intuition which suggests that it should equal 
zero.
Grossman and Hart (1983) suggested an alternative approach for solving the 
principal-agent problem. He proved that when the principal is risk neutral and the 
sufficient conditions (the MLR and CDF conditions) hold, the pareto-optimal contract is 
nondecreasing in output. Jewitt (1988) claimed that even when MLR and CDF 
conditions hold, the first-order approach is no longer valid if the principal can observe 
more than one relevant variable. He replaced the CDF assumption and provided the 
conditions which are valid for problems with more than one variable.
Recently, Chambers and Quiggin (1992, 1993) proposed a different approach for 
the principal-agent problems. They claimed that the difficulties that arise in the 
first-order approach are primarily caused by an overly restrictive representation of 
outcome under uncertainty. In this approach, agents choose a scalar action prior to the 
realisation of a random variable or state of nature. The combination of action and the 
realisation of a random variable uniquely determines outcome. The agent's decision 
problem is thus reduced to one of choosing over a family of cumulative distribution 
functions indexed by action. Outcome in any one state uniquely determines outcome in 
every other state, whatever the reward structure facing the agent. Therefore, interstate 
differences in payments provide little incentive for interstate differences in outcomes. As
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a result, rational properties of an incentive scheme, such as monotonicity, are difficult to 
achieve. The central idea of the Chambers and Quiggin approach is that agent chooses 
not only an input (or action) vector but a state-contingent outcome vectors as well. He 
found that the optimal moral hazard contract must have payments strictly monotonic in 
the level of outcome.
5.2. Uncertainty and moral hazard problem: a model of insurance as 
payment
Consistent with the Chambers and Quiggin approach, an alternative model for 
the central bank and commercial banks' problem is presented in this section. The model 
emphasises the desirability of deregulation (or re-regulation). It models the way 
regulations affect the choice set of action and outcomes available for commercial banks.
In the first-order approach, the commercial bank is viewed as picking an action 
vector prior to the realisation of a continuous random state of nature to maximise 
expected utility. Once the commercial bank selects its action, it has no further control 
over the outcome. Chambers and Quiggin (1992) argue that if the random variable only 
assumes two values ("economic recession" and "economic boom"), the transformation 
function between "economic recession" and "economic boom" is necessarily of the fixed 
coefficient form illustrated by A in Figure 5.1 which implies no disposability of outcome. 
Hence, the commercial bank cannot allocate its available actions to prepare for different 
contingencies (stagnant or overheated economy).
Using the Chambers and Quiggin (1992) arguments, the following model instead 
assumes that the commercial bank chooses not only an action vector but a 
state-contingent outcome vector as well. For any set of action vector, a large set of 
state-contingent outcome vector is likely to be feasible. In the first-order approach, a 
given action vector and a given state determine one outcome level. The present model 
allows for a number of outcome levels to be consistent with a given action vector and a 
given state. It recognises that action or input may be assigned to specific tasks to 
prepare for different contingencies, or substitutability between ex post outcomes. This
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allows the transformation function to assume something other than a fixed-coefficient 
form, ie. the dotted curve in Figure 5.1. The technology can afford this flexibility, ie, 
banking regulations can be designed to make banks organise their actions or inputs in 
this manner. The set of feasible outcomes, for a given action, consists of all outcome 
combinations on or below the production possibility frontier (free disposability of 
output).
Figure 5 .1 Transformation function of the random variable with two values
d2
d l
The assumptions used in this model are the same as in the previous model. The 
central bank (the principal) is risk neutral and the commercial bank (the bank or the 
agent) is risk averse. The central bank is the residual claimant and has the right to specify 
the contract provision. The bank is free to take or to reject the contract offered by the 
central bank. There are two states of nature, and outcome is uncertain, that is the nature 
makes a choice between the two alternatives. Moral hazard arises because the central 
bank cannot observe either the bank's action or the state of nature that actually occurs.
Following the Grossman and Hart (1983) and Chambers and Quiggin (1993) 
procedures, the solution to the agency problem can be broken down into a two-step 
procedure. In the first step, the costs of achieving a particular vector of state-contingent 
outcomes are minimised to generate an "agency-cost" function. In the second step, the
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"agency-cost" function is then used to compute the optimal vector of state-contingent 
actions.
Let a be the action vector committed prior to the resolution of uncertainty and d 
be the vector of state-contingent (ex post) outcomes, i.e. d j  represents the ex post 
outcome if s ta te -1 state of nature occurs, and d2 the outcome if state-2 state of nature 
occurs. The outcome may be a default loan or a loss to the bank. The choices available 
to the bank are represented by a technology set 7={(fl,rf):input a e R +n can yield 
outcome d e R +^}. T is a convex set and satisfies the property of free disposability of 
outcome.
The payment to the bank by the central bank, y , is the net return to the bank.
That is,
y  = 0 for d<0
y  = (1 -p)d for d>pd>0; 0<p<\, where p is the premium rate.
The bank utility function V(*) is defined over wealth or the bank's net profit, or 
V(y,a) = \(y - g(a))
v is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice differentiable, and g is nondecreasing, 
continuous and convex. This utility function differs from that of Chambers and Quiggin 
(1992, 1993) which is defined over wealth and action, and it is separable (the Von 
Neumann-Morgenstem utility function), or V(y,a) = v(y) - g(a).2
Define an "effort cost" as the minimum of g(a) consistent with a producing d 
(Chambers and Quiggin 1992):
C(d) = min (g(a): (a,d)e T}
2The difference between g(a) and h(a) in previous section is that a in g(a) is an action vector 
corresponds to a state-contingent outcome vector (which consists of different levels of outcome) as 
opposed to a in h(a), a given action which corresponds to one outcome level.
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C is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice differentiable. Both the central bank 
and the bank share the same subjective probability distribution k (7t;>0; i = 1,2) about 
the state of nature.
The central bank objective function is:
= n x(dl - y ,) + tc2(d2 - y 2) (1)
The bank's objective function is:
WB = E[v (y -C(d l ,d2))] = iz][v(yl -  C( dx, d2))] + n 2 [v(y2 - C ( d x,d2))\ (2)
(i) Bankruptcy insurance. The payment arrangement thaty = 0 for d<0 and y 
= (1 -p)d for d>pd>0\ 0<p<\, where p is the premium rate, causes the bank not to have 
any incentive to reduce its loss, since any loss to the bank will be covered by the central 
bank. In this case, the bank net return will be zero regardless of the amount of loss to 
the bank. Differentiate the bank's objective function (Equation 2) with respect to dj 
and ^2 t0 obtain the following first order conditions:
rc,[v'(»)(y,' -  C ,(.)]-7 i2[v '(.)C ,(.)] = 0
-7C, [v'(»)C2 (•)] + 7i2 [v'(»)(y2 -  C2 (•)] = 0
Without loss of generality, let state 1 be the 'bad' state associated with lower 
outcome, and state 2 be the 'good' state associated with high outcome. If the outcome is 
loss to the bank, the lower outcome means higher loss (higher negative amount) to the 
bank and vice versa. In the case of loss to the bank , if d\< 0 optimisation requires C \-  
0 for some finite negative d 1, which depends on d2  with C] 2  <0 \n the relevant range. 
Because the size of loss to the bank does not matter, this may lead to bankruptcy. This 
implies that:
^ 2  ~  ^ 2 ^ 2
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The bank will operate as a normal profit maximising agent. There are no incentives for 
the bank to produce more of the good state outcome and reduce the bad state outcome. 
This certainly is not the optimal solution to the case in which a moral hazard problem is 
present, or the second-best solution. There is neither punishment to the bank for 
producing the 'bad' state outcome nor reward for producing the ’good’ outcome.
(ii) The moral hazard problem. The central bank knows v(») and C, and can 
observe ex post outcome levels. It cannot observe either the bank's action vector or the 
state of nature which actually occurs. The bank knows which state of nature actually 
occurs. This informational structure is referred to as the 'second best' and involves an 
incentive or moral hazard problem. The moral hazard problem can be completely 
eliminated if the bank, at zero cost to the central bank, can be compelled to report 
truthfully the state of nature that occurs ex post.
The central bank's problem can thus be presented as:
Max%x( dx - y ,  ) + n 2(d2 - y 2) (3)
d.y
Subject to
rc,[v(y, -  C(d, , d2))] + k 2 [v(y2 -  C(dt , d2))] > V° (4)
TC,[v(y, -  C(d] , d2))] + K2[v(y2 -  C( d , , d2))] > 7t, [v(y, -  C( d x ,</,))] +
^ 2[v(>;! - C ( d I,d ,))] = v(y, - C ( J , , J , ) )
7t,[v(y, -  C ( d ^ d 2))] + n 2[v(y2 - C ( d ], d2))] > 7t,[v(y2 -  C(d2, d2))] +
( 6)
7t2[v(y2 -  C(d2, d2))] = v(y2 - C ( d 2, d2))
[ v( y, - C ( d l , d2))] + n 2[v(y2 -  C(dl , d2))]> n l[v(y2 - C ( d 2, dl ))] +
7t2[v(y2 - C ( J 2,J ,) ) ]
Where V° is the bank's reservation utility level. If y denotes the certainty equivalent 
return (payment) to the bank, then V° = V(y) .
Equation (4) is the bank's participation constraint and in any solution should 
hold with equality (Chambers and Quiggin 1992). Equations (5)-(7) are the incentive 
constraints or the constraints arising from the requirements for truthful reporting of the
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States. The solution of (3) subject to (4) is the first-best solution, and the solution of (3) 
subject to (4)—(7) is the second-best solution.
Given a twice continuous differentiable, strictly concave and strictly increasing 
utility function v, assume the utility function v takes the form of v(x) = -e~^\  where 
A.(jc) = — v"(x) / v'( jc)>0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Equations (4) and 
(5) can be rewritten as:
K\ {-exp[-A,(y, -  C{dx,d2))]} + n2 { -exp[-^ (y2 - C ( d ],d2))]}> V° (4a) 
7t, {-exp[-X,(y, -  C{dx ,d2))]} + n 2 {-exp[-A.(y2 -  C{dx ,d2))]} >
(5a)
-exp[-A.(y, -C (J ,,J ,) ) ]
First-best contract. The first-best contract is obtained if there is no 
informational asymmetry, and hence no incentive or moral hazard problem, i.e. the 
central bank can choose the lowest payment unless the bank chooses the first-best level 
of action or effort. Therefore, the first-best contract is the one where the central bank 
gives the bank a fixed payment, that yields the bank its reservation utility in each state. 
Substitute V° = V(y)  into (4a) to obtain:
tci Vj + K2y2 > y + C(dx ,d2)
y + C( ,d2) represents the least cost to the central bank to induce the bank to produce
the first-best outcome vector. In the first-best minimisation problem, the central bank 
always chooses a fixed payment to the bank equalling y + C(dx ,d2) in each state.
Therefore:
Lemma 1: For a given (d],d2)» if should be the case that y + C(d)  = y, = y2. At the 
optimal, any solution to the principal-agent problem must have the participation 
constraint bind exactly.
The central bank's first-best problem is then to solve the following problem:
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Maxn] (d] — v,) + TZ-, (d0 -  y-,)
ii
subject to (4).
Solve the following Lagrangian:
L = 71, (d] -  y,) + n 2{d2 - y 2) + X[Vu — TC, (v( v, - C { d x,d2) ) \ -  
tc2[ v ( v2 -  C(dx,d2))]
The Lagrangian pointwise optimisation will be characterised by :
C, =  71,
C ,  —  TZ
i.e. if the bank put in an extra dollar, it would increase the outcome by one unit in both 
states 1 and 2. If the central bank paid the bank more than one dollar for every increase 
in the outcome in both states, the bank would be better off, and vice versa.
It follows that:
Result 1: If C displays constant cost,y is linear as a function of d , 
i.e.y(pd) = py(</)
The insurance premium does not depend on the size of the bank.
If the central bank cannot observe both the bank's action as well as the state of 
nature that actually occurs, the above forced payment structure is not optimal. This is 
so because the bank can always shirk by producing a bad state outcome corresponding 
to lower cost to the bank and accepting the same payment as a good state outcome 
which requires higher cost. As in the case of bankruptcy, the fixed-payment structure 
involves neither punishment for producing a bad state outcome nor incentive for 
producing a good state outcome. If the net return to the bank is positive, the incentives 
to shirk will be worse than in the bankruptcy model. (Note that the net return in the
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bankruptcy model is zero if there is loss to the bank). In this case, a different contract 
structure, that is the second-best contract structure, is needed to eliminate the incentive 
problem.
Second-best problem. Lemma l, together with equations (4a) and (5a) yield:
7t1{exp[-X(y1 -  C(<7,, J , ))] -  exp[-A,(y, -  C( dx, d2))]} =
7t2 {exp[-Ä,(y2 -  C(d, ,d2))] -  exp[-A,( y, - C ( d ],d])]}
This implies:
if C(dl ,dl )<C(dl ,d2)=>y2 - C ( d l ,d2) > y l -  C( dx, dx) => y2 > y, (8)
Equation (8) yields monotonicity of the effort-cost function as in the Chambers and 
Quiggin model. This establishes:
Lemma 2: Any solution to the principal-agent problem in the presence of (4) to (7) 
must satisfy:
(y i - y 2)K  - d 2)> 0 
with strict inequality whenever d] ^ d2.
The optimal second-best contract must be monotonic and the bank must be pushed to 
its reservation utility (V°). The monotonicity result is established from the existence of 
a non-negative marginal cost for each state's outcome, which in turn, hinges upon the 
presumption that the technology T is consistent with free disposability of outcome.
"Agency-cost" function. The "agency-cost" function is the minimum cost of 
inducing the bank to produce a given state contingent outcome vector. The agency- 
cost problem is specified as for given d, choose y to:
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Mm 7T, y, + 7t-, v2 (9)
y
Subject to (4) to (7).
The minimisation yields the minimum cost to the central bank of achieving a particular 
outcome vector by the bank that will satisfy the participation constraint and the 
requirements for truthtelling (Grossman and Hart 1983; Chambers and Quiggin 1993).
Lemma 2 implies that high outcomes must be matched by high shares. They do 
not determine which state of nature is the high or the low outcome state. This problem 
can be solved by what it is called the "state-ordering assumption" (SOA) introduced by 
Chambers and Quiggin (1993). The SOA saying that a pair of states 1 and 2 is ordered 
with 1<2 if:
[71, C( J , , ) + 7t2C(d2, d2) -  C( ,d2)] > 0 <=> (d2 -  d]) > 0
with both inequalities strict or neither.
SOA means that it is always costly to disguise a high outcome state as a lower outcome 
state, and vice versa. This establishes the following monotonicity, that is assume that 
SOA holds, for any 1< 2 and y, < v2, an outcome vector (<7,,<72) is monotonic if 
<7, < d2, and strictly monotonic if <7, (<7,.
Chambers and Quiggin (1993) show that any allocation of outcomes and 
utilities that satisfies (5) exactly is downward binding. A downward binding allocation 
is one for which the agent is just indifferent between always producing low outcome 
and producing what the central bank desires. It follows that, suppose SOA holds, then 
for d  monotonic:
i) A downward-binding allocation satisfies all the incentive constraints to the 
agency-cost minimisation problem, and
ii) (6) and (7) are binding in the agency-cost minimisation problem if and only if 
both outcomes are equal.
Therefore:
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Result2: Under SOA, for monotonic d , any solution to the agency-cost problem is
downward binding.
Result 2 is best explained by Figure 5.2. In Figure 5.2, the feasible set, if it is 
nonempty, is given by the cylinder lying above the participation constraint and between 
A and B. At any point other than the intersection between B and the participation 
constraint, agency costs are higher, hence the Result. Intuitively Result 2 means that 
under SOA for d strictly monotonic, the incentive problem reduces to one of inducing 
the bank not to organise production so that the low outcome always occurs. For d 
monotonic, the bank also never has the incentive to arrange that a state-2 outcome 
always occurs because this is always costlier than the allocation that the central bank 
wants.
Figure 5.2 Solution to the agency-cost problem
Central bank's 
indifference curve
Participation 
V  constraint
Given Result 2, the agency-cost problem reduces to a simple closed form 
solution under SOA. Equations (4a) and (5a) yield:
U° = -exp[-A,(y, -  C(dx ,dx)]
yl =C(dl ,dl ) - \ n ( - V ° ) / X
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or
y, = C(dx,dx) + y 
where y = -  ln ( -V°) / X
( 10)
Hence, V° = -exp[-Ay] = V(y)
Denote V, = v(y, -  C{d] ,d2) = v(y + C(d,, dl ) -  C(J, ,d2))(V° (11)
Equation (4) then can be rewritten as
Tt.v, +7t2v2 = V° = k1V° + n2V°
V2 = V ° + k J k2( V ° - V 1)
Define U~l (V) such that 
V(U-' (V) + C(dx,d2)) = V
Hence
y i =u - ' ( V l )
y2 =U~l(V2)
where V, and V2 are given by (11) and (12)
( 12)
(13)
Equation (13) results in the following monotonicity:
Result 3: y2 = y, = y + C(d) if and only if dx -  d2. Otherwise, y2 >y,.
The difference between the payments in the two states is recognised as a moral-hazard 
premium. It measures the bank's gain from shirking by producing {dx,dx) instead of 
(dx,d2). The difference increases as the moral-hazard premium increases, i.e. as the 
riskiness of the bank's balance sheet increases. Hence this difference in payments is
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sufficient to motivate the bank to produce (d] ,dn) as desired by the central bank. Since 
the insurance premium p depends on the moral hazard premium, the insurance 
premium increases as the riskiness of the bank's balance sheet increases.
Suppose SOA holds, for d monotonic, the agency-cost function is given by the 
twice differentiable function:
Y(d,n, V°) = 7T, v, + K2y2 (14)
where y, and y2 are given by (13)
For given C (J,,d2) the agency-cost is increasing in (V° -  V]), that is in d2 - d r
U is convex, since V is concave, so
re IT 1 (V; ) + n 1U-' (V2 )>{/■' (ic, V, + n 2V2)) = U-'(V°) = y
As in the Chambers and Quiggin (1993) model, the simple closed form solution 
of the agency-cost function, equation (14), presented here makes the derivation of 
comparative statics results straightforward. Consider changes in d, that is for monotonic 
d, an increase in dj  will reduce the severity of the moral hazard problem and hence the 
bank’s moral-hazard premium. For a sufficiently risk-averse bank, this may offset the 
increase in production cost, leading to a reduction in agency cost. Any output vector d 
for which dY / dd{ (0, however, cannot represent an optimal solution to the second-best 
problem. On the other hand, an increase in d2 will always increase the moral hazard 
premium. The incentive problem facing the central bank becomes worse as d2 increases 
holding d/ fixed since the bank has an extra cost incentive to shirk. Hence, the central 
bank has to offer extra incentives to encourage the agent to produce ^2- Thus:
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Result 4:
(i) Y is increasing and convex in d2
(ii) Y is not, in general, monotonic in dj
Consider next the effect of changes in d on C(dx,d2). If C displays constant 
cost, an increase in d that also increases d2 /d/ will always increase Y since Y is convex 
and increasing in insurance premium p which depends on the moral-hazard premium. 
The convexity of Y in p also assures that an increase in the moral-hazard premium with 
C(d) held constant must increase the agency cost. This implies that moving around the 
bank's isocost frontier from bad state to good state outcome vectors generates an 
increase in agency cost.
The central bank's second-best problem can now be written as a closed form 
problem subject only to linear constraint. That is,
Maxnx(dx-y , ) + n 2(d2 - y 2) (15)
d.y
where y, and y2 are given by (13) 
subject to:
d, < d 2
The convexity condition of the agency-cost function are sufficient to ensure that this 
problem has a unique solution. Defining a  = d2 -  dx or d2 = dx + a  and substitute this
into (15) and differentiate to obtain the necessary first-order conditions for the second- 
best problem. The concavity of v implies that C2  is increasing, and Cj  is not 
necessarily increasing.
The optimal second-best contract is also characterised by the monotonicity of 
the central bank's net return, d-y, in observed output. Chambers and Quiggin show that 
if dx (d2,
C(dx,d2)(d2 -  d]))C(dx,d2) - C ( d l ,dl ) = K2(y2 -  y ,) + y > n 2(y2 -  y ,) (16)
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where the first inequality follows from the convexity of C, the equality comes from the 
fact that the optimal contract is downward binding and the last inequality is because 
y > 0. (16) implies that:
(d2 - d ]) >( y2 -y ,) ;  and
(d2 - y 2) > (<7,-y,) (17)
The central bank's return increases as the outcome increases, or as loss to the bank 
decreases from state 1 to state 2.
Summarising the computations establishes:
Result 5: For monotonic d under SOA, the optimal second-best contract structure is 
characterised by:
(i) (y , - y 2)(d, ~ d 2)> 0
with strict inequality whenever d] * d2.
(ii) (d2 - d ])>{y2 — v,); and
(d2 -  y2)> (<7, - y , )
.... v.^tr'cv,)
(m)
y2 = u~'(V2)
where Vj and V2 are given by (11) and (12)
The monotonicity results (i) and (ii) imply that the optimal second-best contract 
requires the bank to bear some of the production risk by sharing in the outcome (loss) 
increase between state 1 and state 2. Similar to the Chambers and Quiggin (1993) 
model, Result (iii) implies that the optimal second-best contract allows the bank to reap 
the full marginal benefit from increasing outcome (reducing loss to the bank) from <7, 
to d2. Therefore, it effectively makes the bank the residual claimant in state 2, the good 
outcome state of nature. This is the easiest way to solve the incentive problem, that is to 
prevent the bank from shirking by misinterpreting the good outcome state of nature as 
the bad outcome state of nature by arranging to always produce <7,.
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As a consequence, Result (iii) also implies that the payment, or net return, to the 
bank in state 2 should be greater than the payment in state 1. The difference equals the 
moral hazard premium. The difference in the payments is necessary to eliminate the 
moral hazard problem. The higher payment to the bank in state 2 will encourage the 
bank to shift it production pattern to state 2 outcome from state 1 outcome that the 
central bank desires. Hence, the incentive to shirk by always producing a bad state 
outcome is eliminated.
5.3. Conclusion
This chapter concludes that by internalising risks associated with a moral hazard 
problem into loan insurance structure, it is possible to arrive at an optimal contract 
between commercial banks and the central bank. The asymmetrical information may 
not lead to excessive risk-taking behaviour of commercial banks. This would 
necessarily reduce the trade off between efficiency gains and instability of the 
payments system resulting from financial deregulation.
The model, however, implies that in the absence of a well regulated 
environment, the optimal contract cannot fully prevent the payments system failures 
resulting from factors such as lack of skilled staff and poor risk management. To 
achieve a stable and efficient payments system, the contract should be accompanied by 
banking supervision. The next chapter discusses policy implications of the model 
together with banking supervision to support the application of the model.
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Chapter 6
Policy Implications of the Model of State Loan Insurance
Introduction
It is widely believed that bank failures, which have occurred both in developed and 
developing countries in the last two decades, were largely caused by the so called "moral 
hazard" problem. The moral hazard problem arises because the (implicit and explicit) 
deposit insurance subsidy provided by the government creates incentives for shareholders 
of commercial banks to take on excessive risk. Many studies have been done and their 
results support the moral hazard argument. For example, studies have been done by 
Merton (1977), Markus and Shaked (1984), Kane (1985), Keeley (1990), and White 
(1991) for developed countries; and by Harberger (1984), Hanson and de Melo (1985), 
Corbo and de Melo (1985), Diaz-Alejandro (1985), and Park (1991) for developing 
countries.
In line with the above studies, Chapter 5 supports the argument that an effective 
banking sector cannot be sustained by unregulated free banking or market competition 
alone. Therefore, some kind of government intervention in banking is desirable. The 
chapter then explores the theory of loan insurance to avoid the trade off between 
efficiency gains and safety of the payments system in the context of financial 
deregulation.
The theoretical model of loan insurance is presented in two different approaches. 
The 'first-order' approach and the 'uncertainty' approach. Using risk-sharing and 
incentive contract theory, both approaches internalise the risks that are present in loan 
markets. Such internalisation is essential for an optimal contract between the central bank 
and the commercial bank.
The first-order approach makes it possible to identify the types of contingencies 
that cause default loans so that a 'fair' optimal sharing rule can be applied. The approach, 
however, contains several weaknesses. One implausible result is that it fails to satisfy the
monotonicity condition of the sharing schedule (i.e. the more prudent the bank, the lower 
the share of the loss the bank has to bear) which is a condition that must hold for an 
optimal sharing rule. Another weakness lies in the assumption that the commercial bank 
can choose only an 'action' vector, not an 'outcome' vector, from an infinite set of action 
vectors. This implies that the bank cannot ex ante allocate its available actions to 
prepare for different contingencies (states of nature) in order to achieve the desirable 
outcome. This assumption, together with the result that penalties will not be imposed if 
default loans were caused by factors outside the bank's control, gives enough room for 
breakdowns in the banking system to occur.
The uncertainty approach is set up to minimise the weaknesses of the first-order 
approach. Besides assuming that action can be taken from a finite set of action vectors 
consistent with a finite set of outcome vectors, the approach also recognises that action 
may be assigned to specific tasks to prepare for different contingencies. This means that 
the bank's action has to be a function of the state(s) of nature. Any state of nature has to 
be anticipated and be reflected in the action. For simplicity, it is assumed that there are 
two states of nature; state 1 is 'bad' state associated with high loss to the bank and state 
2 is 'good' state associated with lower loss or even profits to the bank. Government 
intervention may be desirable to help banks in preparing for the contingencies, and hence 
minimising the possibility of breakdown. This is the main objective of this chapter, that is 
to seek the extent and ways in which government intervention can affect the choice set of 
action and outcome vectors for commercial banks, so that an efficient and stable banking 
system is sustainable. The analysis will be based mainly on the uncertainty approach.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section one analyses the main 
results of the model. Government intervention and other explanations for banking 
behaviour, which are the main content of this chapter, are examined in section two. 
Section three presents the conclusions.
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6.1. The results of the model
The assumptions used in the model are the standard assumptions for the risk-sharing rule 
in the literature on the principal-agent relationship. A risk-neutral central bank is 
contracting with a risk-averse commercial bank (the bank) in the context of loan 
insurance. The contract provision is specified by the central bank. The bank, however, is 
free to take or to reject the contract. The bank chooses an action vector as well as a 
state-contingent outcome vector from finite sets of action and outcome vectors.
As discussed in Chapter 5 the bank's action is assumed to be its prudence in 
lending, and the outcome can be the amount of default loans or the amount of profits to 
the bank. If the outcome is default loans, a better outcome is associated with a smaller 
amount of default loans. If the outcome is profits, a better outcome is associated with a 
higher level of profits. The bank's action may affect the probability and the size of the 
outcome. Both action and outcome vectors are monotonic, ie., aj<a2  and d]<d2 where 
a( is action and d( is outcome. If d  is the amount of default loans, dj<d2  means the 
amount of default loans of dj  is higher than d2, ie. outcome d2 is better than outcome 
dj.  The more prudent the bank, the lower the amount of default loans, (or the higher the 
amount of profits to the bank).
The net return to the bank is (y=d-pd). The bank pays the central bank the 
insurance premium, pd, where p is the insurance premium rate. In the case of a default, 
the central bank will pay an amount equal to the amount of the default loans to the 
bank.1 The return to the central bank is d-y-pd.
The central bank cannot observe either the bank's action or the state of nature 
that actually occurs. This informational structure produces the moral hazard or the 
incentive problem. That is the incentive to shirk or to take on risk excessively by 
behaving imprudently (i.e. extending too much risky lending) and producing a low 
outcome state (i.e. having a high amount of default loans).
!In the case of no default, the central bank will not give any payment to the bank. If the outcome 
(profits), d, is greater than the insurance premium, pd, the net return to the bank will be positive. For 
simplicity, the analysis here will focus on the amount of default as the outcome.
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With these assumptions in place, the bases for an optimal contract between the 
commercial bank (the bank) and the central bank are established. Uncertainty of the 
outcome and the resulting moral hazard problem in banking are two important elements 
in modelling the contract. Several interesting results can be drawn from the model, which 
characterises the optimal (second-best) contract between the central bank and the bank. 
(The first-best contract is of course the one in which the incentive problem is not 
present).
Given the second best contract, one of the results states that the central bank, the 
insurer, would like to see the bank take more effort or action towards increased 
prudence in lending. One way to induce increased effort on the part of the bank not to 
shirk (or deviate from the first-best contract) is to allow the bank to reap fully the 
marginal benefit from its action. The marginal benefit from its action is reflected in the 
increased outcome from the 'bad' state to the 'good' state. If the outcome is the amount 
of default loans or loss to the bank, an increased outcome means a decrease in the loss to 
the bank.
As a consequence of the above result, the net return to the bank increases as the 
outcome increases. The net return to the bank in the 'good' state (i.e. lower losses to the 
bank) should be higher than the net return in the 'bad' state (i.e. higher losses). The 
difference between the 'good' state and the 'bad' state returns equals the moral-hazard 
premium or risk premium. The higher net return to the bank will encourage the bank to 
increase action (i.e. enhance prudence), hence producing more 'good' state outcomes (i.e. 
lower losses). With this arrangement, the incentive to shirk by always taking less action 
and producing 'bad' state outcomes is eliminated. This implies that, in the case of 
defaults, the net return to the bank, y, is not a fixed amount (as is the case in the first- 
best contract discussed in Chapter 5).
Another result from the model is that an increase in the moral-hazard premium 
increases the difference between net returns in the 'bad' state and the 'good' state. Since 
the insurance premium, p, depends on the moral-hazard premium, the insurance premium 
increases as the moral hazard premium increases. This result implies that the insurance 
premium is positively correlated to the riskiness in the bank's balance sheet, reflected in
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the moral-hazard premium. If the cost of producing outcome in both the 'bad' and 'good' 
states displays constant cost, then the insurance premium does not depend on the size of 
the bank.
The optimal contract is also characterised by monotonicity of the bank's net 
return. The net return to the bank must increase as the loss to the bank decreases. This 
is consistent with the monotonicity results for moral hazard models that are established 
from the existence of a non-negative marginal cost for each state's outcome.
The optimal contract also produces monotonicity of the central bank return. The 
absolute amount of insurance premium decreases as the loss to the bank decreases. The 
implication of the two monotonicity results (the bank and the central bank returns) is that 
in the optimal second-best contract, the bank and the central bank bear (or share) the 
risk. An increase in loss to the bank will be shared among both parties. Note that the 
optimal first-best contract will be the one in which the net return to the bank in the 
'good' state equals the net return in the 'bad' state. Since there is no asymmetry of 
information, a forcing contract could be used to guarantee that the bank chooses the 
desired action vector. In return, the central bank provides a fixed net return in each state 
of nature. In the presence of information asymmetry, however, the fixed net return 
arrangement is not optimal. The fixed net return arrangement does not give the bank 
incentive to increase efforts which are financially costly to the bank. It also gives 
incentives to the bank always to make low efforts in lending prudently as this involves 
lower financial cost and results in higher losses to the bank in the future. Hence, the fully 
efficient production pattern is unachievable.
The main objective of having a loan insurance system, however, is not only the 
welfare of either the central bank or the bank alone, but also the safety of the payments 
system as a whole. This may involve high effort associated with high financial costs for 
both the bank and the central bank.
The central bank does not have to be the provider of insurance. Both 
state-owned and private companies can do this. The central bank can simply mandate 
that banks must have some minimum package of insurance, and designs optimal 
regulations which affect the managers' and owners' decisions.
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The model, however, cannot prevent bank failures that are caused by factors 
other than moral hazard, such as the lack of skilled staff and poor risk management in 
commercial banks. To enable the state loan insurance to work effectively, some kind of 
government regulation and bank supervision are necessary. The main issue, therefore, is 
finding the correct regulations that may act as linear constraints on the action, and hence, 
outcome vectors of the bank.2 These regulations should also aim at encouraging 
commercial banks to improve their management skills and techniques through internal 
supervision and training.
Numerous studies have been conducted to analyse the interaction of firms in the 
market place (Tirole, 1988). These studies design a number of performance measures to 
limit managerial discretion. The measures rest on a comparison of the firms' (agents') 
performances, to enable the authority to reward firms when their performances are 
observable but not verifiable (the correctness or the truth of the performance is not 
verifiable) . There is also a measure, known as yardstick competition. "Yardstick 
competition relies on the correlation of the agents' [firms'] technologies, but not on the 
nonverifiability of performances" (Tirole, 1988:42). With uncertainty perfectly correlated 
among firms and the same level of action yielding the same profits, firms will 
automatically reveal how hard they work through the levels of profit they achieve. Firms 
which do not put in much effort will produce low profits and should be fined. The 
optimal contract is therefore one in which reward to one firm depends on rewards to 
other firms.
It should also be noted that the performance of a particular bank is only a 
'garbled' measure of the bank's actions or efforts. Bad loans or losses to the bank may be 
due more to other factors such as an increase in costs and a decrease in demand than to 
managerial inadequacy. High exchange rate risk and a thin money market, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, are included among these other factors. This justifies the need for 
improvement in the government's ability to control macroeconomic conditions.
2If the government does not provide a loan insurance system, perhaps regulations will be difficult to 
implement because sanctions associated with regulations become inappropriate or inconsistent with 
banking liberalisation.
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6.2. Regulations and other explanations for banking behaviour
The trade off between efficiency gains and safety of the payments system motivates the 
construction of the loan insurance scheme. The scheme entails requirements that should 
be fulfilled by banks in the scheme. The requirements may act as some kind of banking 
regulations. The nature of regulations in this model, however, is different to that 
suggested by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) on deposit insurance or lender of last resort 
function of the central bank; Smith (1984) and Anderlini (1986) on interest rate ceilings; 
or Freeman (1988) on reserve requirements.
Diamond and Dybvig examine why banks are subject to potential damaging runs, 
and what the government could do to protect them. Runs on a bank occur when many 
depositors 'panic' and withdraw their deposits because they anticipate that the 
intermediary will run out of assets. They find that banking instability is caused by 
uncertainty of depositors' liquidity demand and the fact that banks' assets are less liquid 
than their liabilities. Banking instability is harmful because it ruins risk-sharing 
arrangements and damages production. Bank runs are also a problem because if they 
occur, even healthy banks might fail because of the loss of value of their assets when they 
have to liquidate these assets quickly. The authors suggest that the instability creates a 
need for government intervention in the form of a deposit insurance system or lender of 
last resort function. Anderlini, Smith, and Freeman, among others, develop the Diamond 
and Dybvig model and use it to justify additional policies such as interest rate ceilings 
and reserve requirements.
The main criticism of these authors' suggestions on banking regulations is that 
they lack a sound foundation for government involvement in banking and that they are 
inconsistent with the existence of market discipline in financial intermediation, i.e. free 
banking (see, for example, Dowd 1992).
Banking instability used in the model of state loan insurance in this paper is not 
bank runs as in the Diamond and Dybvig model. The uncertainty of depositors' liquidity 
demand and the illiquid nature of bank assets relative to their liabilities are not the main 
causes of banking instability in Indonesia. Instead, instability is caused by banks taking on
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excessive risk as a result of the bail out system adopted by the government. The bail out 
system makes banks rarely suffer the consequences of poor lending and other decisions. 
Lack of experienced staff and inadequate supervision, together with other factors 
explained in Chapter 3, reinforced banking instability.
Since a fully liberalised banking system may not be able to sustain a stable and 
efficient payments system, the model formalises the bail out system and incorporates 
risk-sharing rules into its structure to eliminate moral hazard or incentive problems. 
Therefore, the objective of the regulations arising from the model is primarily to ensure 
that the loan insurance system can effectively sustain the stability of banking. Because the 
regulations can be seen as the minimum requirements for joining the insurance scheme, 
they are not necessarily inconsistent with banking deregulation.
In the loan insurance model, the government can intervene in banking by setting 
constraints on the effort cost function of the banks, eg., minimum action requirements for 
prudence lending. In the model this means putting linear constraints on the outcome 
vector (and the action vector) . Although the bank's action is unobservable by the central 
bank, the minimum action vector and the ex post outcome vector are observable.3 The 
minimum outcome in this context will be the maximum allowable default loans. Only 
banks with the required minimum action and outcome will be allowed to join the 
insurance scheme. The central bank can discontinue their membership when the banks' 
action and outcome fall below their minimum levels. Furthermore, only the minimum and 
better outcomes will be covered by the insurance scheme.
Regulations relevant to the model will be the ones that minimise risks associated 
with uncertainty either in credit markets or in other activities conducted by commercial 
banks. Maximum legal lending limits fall into this category of regulations. In Indonesia, 
the regulations were imposed since October 1988. The limits are calculated as a 
percentage of the bank's capital: namely 20 per cent to both a single borrower and a
3The effort cost function in the model then can be written as:
C (d ) = m in{g(a);(a,</) e T},a > a* ,d > d*
where a* and d* are minimum action and minimum outcome respectively.
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group of borrowers. The goal of the limits is to prevent the concentration of loans, and 
hence, risks, to relatively few groups of borrowers.
Particular attention should be paid to the ownership structure of banks in 
Indonesia. Because most major private banks are owned by business groups and a large 
part of the banks’ loans flow into intra group projects, the ownership of banks becomes a 
relevant issue. Besides increasing the concentration of loans to few (inside) borrowers, 
this type of ownership structure tends to make banks not lend to projects on the basis of 
credit worthiness and business prospects. If it is difficult to alter ownership structure by 
regulation, then the business group that owns the bank should be treated as one group of 
borrowers and they would only be able to receive loans up to 20 per cent of the bank's 
capital.
Since commercial banks are supposed to be encouraged to minimise risks of bad 
lending, the regulations that require banks to extend their loans to priority sectors are 
inconsistent with the optimal insurance contract. In Indonesia, the regulations include the 
requirements for domestic banks to allocate a minimum of 20 per cent of their loan 
portfolio to small business and for foreign banks to extend 50 per cent of their credits to 
export-oriented industries. These regulations distort the risk-sharing rules between the 
central bank and commercial banks.
Internal supervision and standardisation of accounting techniques in Indonesian 
banking are two important areas that must be improved to minimise credit risks. Lack of 
experienced staff and inadequate management techniques meant that internal supervision 
was inevitably poor. Risk management was particularly weak and accounting practices 
did not always value the quality of bank assets properly. Inadequate accounting 
standards were again a problem. This meant that bank supervision could not be efficient 
as supervisors did not have reports of adequate quality. An internal audit system in the 
banking industry is also crucial for safe and sound banking. It was believed that problems 
often arose because the internal audit system in many banks was inadequate and 
discipline in enforcing such a system was lacking. Weak and inefficient internal structures 
increased losses. Being aware of the problem, in January 1995 Bank Indonesia issued 
measures to achieve a minimum standard of requirements on bank internal audit systems.
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The central bank as bank supervisors, on the other hand, should be equipped with 
adequate skilled and professional staff. Besides supervising banks, the central bank 
should also monitor the soundness of the commercial banks continuously. The 
monitoring system should aim at providing an 'early warning system' to troubled banks 
and supervising those banks immediately.
Any effort to improve the above problems will reduce risks, especially credit 
risks. For example, the government could set up training institutions for banking staff. 
(In January 1995, Bank Indonesia stipulated that a minimum of 5 per cent of a bank's 
personnel expenses be spent for training and education of bank staff; at the same time a 
measure to ban persons inadmissible for bank management and ownership due to 
criminal activity or other misconduct, was issued; also recently Indonesian Bankers' 
Institute has formulated and implemented a bankers’ code of ethics). The government 
should also effectively enforce an appropriate legal framework for banking operations 
and sanctions against those breaking the rules of this framework. Legislation regarding 
bankruptcy and procedures to seize collateral in the event of defaults on loans should 
also be enforced.
There are several other issues that may affect the overall banking risks. They are 
issues related to balance-sheet risks, which include interest-rate mismatch risk, liquidity 
risk, and foreign exchange risk; price risks, such as market-liquidity risk, issuer risk, 
instrument risk, and the risk of changes in commodity prices, interest rates and exchange 
rates; and operating and liquidity risks, which consist of risk of loss due to technical 
failure to execute or settle a transaction and risk of loss due to adverse change in the 
cash flows of the transaction.
These three categories of risks are not covered by the loan insurance scheme 
developed in this paper. Their effects on banking stability, however, are quite significant. 
Their immediate effects are normally reflected in the volatility of the short-term interest 
rate (see discussion in Chapter 3). The government could reduce the volatility by 
encouraging interest-rate futures management by commercial banks through encouraging 
supervision and training.
92
Banking supervision, as well as training, is the key to control risk. The 
supervision involves defining, measuring, and understanding risk. A large amount of 
work has been done to study risk and incorporate it into financial modelling. Although 
each bank may have different definitions of risk, they agree with the common element of 
risk, that is the volatility of the potential outcomes. The volatility (riskiness) of a 
particular outcome is usually measured by the standard deviation of the outcome. The 
standard deviation is the square root of variance or how much an outcome is expected to 
deviate from the neutral outcome. Ceteris paribus the volatility of an outcome in the past 
can be used to predict its volatility pattern in the future. Understanding the pattern and 
the behaviour of the riskiness of outcomes and using market instruments to manage 
volatility, constitute the main elements of banking stability. It is the nature of banking to 
deal with all types of risk. It may also be socially acceptable for banks to take on risk in 
particular projects which have national interest. But it is not acceptable for banks to take 
on excessive risk which could endanger the stability of the payment system. The 
management of risk is therefore essential for banks. The objective is not to have a risk­
free banking, but to manage risk and hence attain a safe and sound banking system.
In the early stages of supervision, the government may also impose several 
regulations to reduce risks. For example, it may set the maximum net open foreign 
exchange position (the amount of foreign currency claims and obligations, including 
off-balance sheet transactions) a bank can hold in proportion to its capital, the minimum 
capital in proportion to risk-weighted assets, and minimum reserve requirements.
The definition of foreign exchange position should be clearly specified. If it only 
involves financial assets and liabilities, the position can be defined as the net present 
value of all the relevant future cash flows in each currency discounted by the interest 
rates of risk-free zero coupon bonds denominated in the respective currencies. The net 
present value of foreign currency cash flows is significantly affected by changes in 
foreign interest rates. Since interest rate and exchange rate movements are often 
correlated, sometimes it is difficult to separate exchange rate and interest rate risk. If the 
foreign exchange position involves investment in foreign subsidiaries, the foreign 
currency convertible bonds issued by banks, and other assets and liabilities, the position
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is difficult to define clearly. Fukao (1991) suggests that banks have to take account of 
the ratio of foreign currency assets to total assets in order to appropriately control their 
foreign exchange position. Furthermore, to maintain an adequate capital-asset ratio, it is 
advantageous for banks with large foreign currency assets to hold certain open long 
positions in the same currency.
Several important points regarding capital adequacy requirements also need 
attention. 4 An adequate amount of capital can be used as a buffer against unexpected 
risk, i.e. to prevent runs by reassuring potentially nervous depositors. Banks issue both 
bond (debt) and equity claims. A study by Jacklin (1988) finds that demand for bonds is 
sensitive to uncertainty which leads to bank runs, while demand for equity is not subject 
to runs but is very sensitive to informational asymmetries about underlying portfolio 
values. The value of debt, for example, is not affected by the underlying project return, 
while the value of equity is affected by any information about the return to production. 
Banks that issue too much debt claims are vulnerable to runs. Therefore, an adequately 
capitalised bank is necessary for banking stability.
The central question really is how much capital is adequate to reassure 
depositors. Too low a capital base (that covers some conceivable loss) will lead to bank 
runs. On the other hand, too high a capital base will lower the return on bank equity, and 
hence, will make the equity harder to attract. It follows that the adequate level of capital 
will be positively correlated to depositors' risk aversion and the riskiness of the bank's 
portfolio, and negatively correlated to the return on equity elsewhere.
Reserve requirements are still imposed on Indonesian banks after all other direct 
monetary instruments had been lifted following banking deregulation. The most common 
justifications for their imposition are that they may help to stabilise the money base and 
thus facilitate the use of other monetary instruments; reserve requirements have also a 
fiscal impact, a means of taxing financial services; and reserve requirements can be used 
to ensure that banks hold a prudent level of liquid assets (Hardy 1993).
4Capital, in Indonesia, is defined as the sum of paid up capital, reserves and retained earnings, and 
government guaranteed foreign borrowings.
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While their effectiveness as a monetary instrument is questionable, the design of 
reserve requirements can strongly influence their effect on banks' behaviour. Hardy 
(1993) shows that the variance of broad monetary aggregate due to fluctuations in the 
demand for excess reserves and for broad money is lower, the higher are the reserve 
requirements. The level of reserve requirements will also affect the variance of the 
interest rate. A higher reserve requirement ratio will increase the sensitivity of interest 
rates to disturbances in demand for broad money, and decrease the variance caused by 
disturbances in the market for reserve money.
However, Hardy also shows that positive reserve requirements are not necessary 
for monetary control if there is a stable demand for excess reserves. Even with zero 
reserve requirements, the central bank could intervene in the market for reserve money 
so as to affect interest rates and thus, eventually, broad money, provided that there are 
other instruments available, i.e. security or money markets are well developed to conduct 
open market operations.
As a means of taxing financial services, reserve requirements are also 
questionable. Unlike a deposit tax that will be directed at those receiving transaction 
services from banks, the cost of reserve requirements is distributed between borrowers 
and depositors in the form of a spread between lending and deposit rates. An increase in 
reserve requirements raises costs in banking and reduces the ability to obtain deposits 
and to lend. Therefore, reserve requirements entail a quantity constraint on the public's 
portfolio (Hardy 1993; Stiglitz and Greenwald 1992).
As for maintaining reserve requirements to ensure adequate liquidity, it is argued 
that what banks should have is prudential liquidity requirements which include many 
liquid assets and liabilities and not necessarily deposits with central banks as a proportion 
of banks' deposit liabilities. The inclusion of other types of liquid assets and liabilities into 
the reserve requirements category should be carefully specified. Inappropriate design of 
reserve requirements can even reduce bank liquidity. (For example, low interest bearing 
and illiquid government securities would increase the riskiness of a bank's portfolio).
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6 . 3 . Conclusion
Uncertainty of outcomes and the resulting moral hazard problem in banking motivate the 
exploration of appropriately priced loan insurance based on the risk-sharing contract 
theory. Several characteristics of an optimal (second-best) scheme are identified. Such a 
scheme, however, presents the possibility that banks will choose a low action vector to 
produce a low outcome vector (i.e. less resources devoted to prudential lending so that 
higher defaults result). The possibility arises from the fact that banks can choose any 
action vector and outcome vector from unconstrained sets of action and outcome 
vectors. With this set up, although the optimal contract can still be implemented, the 
stability of the payments system cannot be guaranteed.
This chapter proposes several types of government intervention that could be 
implemented to ensure that the insurance scheme will be able effectively to sustain the 
stability of the banking system. The characteristics of the intervention lie in banking 
supervision to minimise credit risks rather than traditional regulations which distort the 
market mechanism. The regulations include maximum lending limits to single and group 
of borrowers, and internal managerial supervision in banking. An appropriate legal 
framework for banking operations and sanctions against breaking the rules of this 
framework are also integral parts of the regulations.
This chapter also argues that there are several other factors that are potentially 
damaging to the stability of the payments system. They are issues related to 
balance-sheet risks, price risks, and operating and liquidity risks. Banking supervision 
and training, involving the definition and management of risk are the key. In the early 
stages of supervision, several government regulations, such as maximum net foreign 
exchange position and minimum reserve requirements, can be imposed on banks to 
reduce the risks. While at these early stages, the central bank may act as lender of last 
resort to reduce the effects of these risks on (short-term) interest rates. In the longer 
term, however, training commercial banks in the use of market instruments to manage 
risks associated with exchange rate and interest rate volatility, should be the goal.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions
Financial deregulation in Indonesia has successfully improved banking 
competition and markedly increased financial deepening. This, however, was not 
accompanied by similar successes that would enable the central bank to shift smoothly 
from direct to indirect controls over monetary aggregates. For this to occur, there would 
need to be money market development, stable exchange rate expectations and banking 
supervision.
A thin money market and unstable exchange rate expectations led to high and 
volatile domestic interest rates. The highly leveraged corporations contributed to 
maintaining high real interest rates. High levels of debt financing led to distress 
borrowing from banks with high interest rates reflecting the riskiness of the loans. The 
difficulties in the enforcement of bank supervision measures, together with the bail out 
system adopted by the government to rescue troubled banks, resulted in moral hazard 
problems. Banks took on excessive risks in lending. This behaviour was exaggerated by 
the close ties between banks and businesses, which resulted in the concentration of loans 
to few borrowers. Banks became burdened by high non-performing loans when 
borrowers' businesses slowed and the borrowers started facing difficulties in paying 
interest on loans. Furthermore, lack of skilled staff and inadequate management 
knowledge and techniques led to poor management of risks. Banks continued to 
provide credits at high real interest rates.
As a result, for almost a decade from 1984, real interest rates were relatively 
high and at the end of 1993 both bad debts and non-performing loans in banking were 
mounting. As for the state-owned banks, the large amount of bad debts and 
non-performing loans were also caused by their role more as development agencies 
before and after deregulation than as commercial banks. Many of their loans to big 
projects were made based on political influences to them than on the credit worthiness 
of the borrowers.
The Indonesian experience showed a classic example of the trade-off between 
financial deepening and banking instability under financial deregulation in the presence of 
a bail out system by the central bank and inadequate supervision of banks. A free market 
competition in banking with no central bank guarantees, however, is not feasible. The 
market mechanism cannot provide the positive externalities associated with the use of 
money. Furthermore, the presence of the so called "systemic risk" — such as the risk of a 
run on the payments system— that can neither be diversified away nor hedged through 
capital markets, means that the market on its own cannot sustain a stable payments 
system. The high social costs of having bank failures — a possibility of an unregulated 
market system— could destabilise the economy. Therefore, some form of central bank 
intervention is needed to prevent the payments system from disruptions and breakdowns 
caused by such systemic risk.
Deposit insurance is one form of central bank intervention. The main objection to 
having a deposit insurance system is that it produces a moral hazard problem in banking. 
It encourages banks to take more risks than they otherwise would. This is so because the 
central bank insurance operates as a guarantee, so that the insurance premium charged 
to commercial banks is zero. All depositors are fully protected against loss, and hence 
banks rarely suffer from poor lending.
To overcome the above problem, a theoretical model of loan insurance is 
constructed. It internalises all the risks that are present in loan markets to obtain 
correctly priced insurance. The risks include not only those associated with uncertainty 
of the loan repayment, but also risks that arise from the uncertainty of banks' behaviour 
towards risks under such an insurance scheme. The incorporation of the second type of 
risks, which are not incorporated into the existing central bank guarantees, enables the 
central bank to eliminate the moral hazard problem in bank lending and at the same time 
give assurance or confidence to depositors. The model forms the basis for specifying an 
optimal risk-sharing contract between the central bank and commercial banks that can 
sustain an efficient and sound banking system. The actual 'blueprint' for such a contract, 
however, requires simulations of the theoretical model, and is the subject of future work.
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The loan insurance model assumes that there are two states of nature, 'good' and 
'bad' states associated with high and low 'outcomes' respectively, in which a bank, given 
an 'action' level, will produce a certain outcome level. The bank's action is the bank's 
efforts in prudence lending: the higher the action level, the greater the degree of 
prudence. The outcome is the loss to the bank from lending, or default loans, the higher 
the outcome, the lower the loss to the bank. 'Good' state outcome is associated with low 
loss to the bank and 'bad' state outcome is associated with high loss to the bank. The 
moral hazard arises because both the state of nature that actually occurs and the bank's 
action are unobservable by the central bank. In the event of loss to the bank through 
default loans, the bank's net return is y = d -  pd where d is the outcome and p is the 
insurance premium. The return to the central bank, therefore, is d -  y = p d . The model 
can easily be extended to the case where there are more than two states of nature.
In the absence of moral hazard, that is the first-best case, the optimal contract 
would be the one in which the bank's net return, or the payment by the central bank, is 
fixed in both 'good' and 'bad' states to the bank. The payment in the 'good' state also 
equals the payment in the 'bad' state. Since there is no asymmetrical information, the 
central bank can always pay the lowest payment to the bank unless the bank chooses the 
first-best level of action.
The fixed payment is not optimal in the presence of moral hazard because it does 
not give the bank incentives to increase action or its prudence in lending, which involves 
a higher financial cost to the bank. The fixed payment also gives the bank incentives to 
shirk, that is to always make a low level of effort associated with lower financial costs. 
This corresponds to imprudent lending behaviour and high losses to the bank. By 
allowing the bank to reap the marginal benefit from greater prudence (higher level of 
action), reflected in the decreased loss to the bank, the bank will be induced to increase 
action.
Therefore, the optimal contract, known as the second-best contract, would 
require that net return (the payment) to the bank in the 'good' state should be greater 
than the net return in the 'bad' state. The difference between the two payments equals the 
moral-hazard premium or risk premium. This premium measures the difference in cost
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to the bank between making low level effort and high level effort in lending. With this 
payments arrangement, the bank is encouraged to make higher effort in prudence 
lending, hence eliminating the incentives to shirk. The difference between the two 
payments increases as the moral-hazard premium increases.
The moral-hazard premium is reflected in the riskiness of the bank's balance 
sheet. The insurance premium, p, depends on the moral-hazard premium. It increases 
with the riskiness of the bank's balance sheet. If the cost of producing outcome in both 
the 'good' state and the 'bad' state is constant, then the insurance premium does not 
depend on the size of the bank.
The optimal contract is also characterised by monotonicities of the bank and the 
central bank's return. Higher outcome must be matched by higher return, and vice versa. 
The net return to the bank must increase as the loss to the bank decreases. The return to 
the central bank must also increase as the loss to the bank decreases. The optimal 
second-best contract thus requires the bank to bear some of the risk by sharing the 
increase in the bank's loss from the 'good' state to the 'bad' state.
Loan insurance clearly can eliminate moral hazard in banking. It cannot, 
however, fully prevent bank failures. Apart from moral hazard, bank failures can also 
occur because of factors such as lack of skilled labour and poor management of risks 
other than those present in loan markets. The risk-sharing contract implies that the 
central bank will allow banks to fail, for market discipline to work effectively. 1 It is 
sometimes optimal ex post to allow an individual bank to fail. It becomes undesirable to 
do so if this would lead to widespread failure and destabilise the payments system.
For the above reasons, effective regulation, supervision and monitoring of banks 
become very necessary, primarily to ensure that an efficient and sound banking system is 
sustained. Unlike the traditional regulations, banking regulations here emphasise the 
placing of minimum requirements on banks to ensure soundness of the banks for joining 
the insurance scheme, while the supervision focuses on the improvement of risk
*Note that the monotonicity of the bank's net return implies that the bank would would have 
negative net return, if the bank produced losses. If losses were too high, they could lead to the bank 
bankruptcy.
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management in banking. This implies that commercial banks can join the insurance 
scheme after satisfying the requirements.
The regulations include effective enforcement of lending limits both to single and 
group borrowers. This regulation is intended to spread credit risks among borrowers. 
The ownership of banks by business groups, as is the case in Indonesia, also needs 
particular attention. Regulation regarding the ownership structure of banks is very 
important to remove the concentration of loans to a few groups of (inside) borrowers. It 
can also increase the amount of loans that go to projects on the basis of credit 
worthiness and business prospects. The existing regulation that requires banks to extend 
their loans to priority sectors is inconsistent with the optimal contract. This is because 
such regulation distorts the risk-sharing rules between the central bank and banks.
Minimum capital adequacy, that is the minimum capital to risk-weighted assets 
ratio, is another regulation necessary for banking stability. It can be used as a buffer 
against unexpected risk, i.e. to prevent runs by reassuring potentially nervous depositors. 
Deciding how much capital is adequate to reassure depositors is an area the central bank 
needs to study carefully. Too low a capital base will lead to bank runs. Too high a 
capital base, on the other hand, will lower the return on bank equity, and hence will 
make the equity harder to attract. The riskiness of assets should be assessed with care. 
Loans that go to a particular sector may be very risky only because this sector consists 
of risky borrowers and not because it is a risky sector. A risky sector for one bank may 
not be risky at all for another bank. The relative riskiness of assets should be 
recalculated frequently, i.e. every year. The central bank needs to have adequate skilled 
staff and knowledge to do the job properly.
Internal supervision in Indonesian banking is urgent. Lack of experienced staff 
and inadequate management techniques meant that internal supervision was inevitably 
poor, while external supervision was hindered by inadequate accounting standards since 
supervisors did not have reports of adequate quality. Accounting standardisation is also 
very important for accurate monitoring of banks by the central bank, and hence an early 
warning system can be performed effectively. For these reasons, the central bank should 
set up training institutions for banking staff, including the use of market instruments in
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the management of risks arising from volatility of exchange rates and interest rates. The 
central bank should also improve the knowledge and professionalism of its staff to help 
achieve an effective system of monitoring of banks. At the same time, the legal 
framework for banking operations and sanctions against breaking the rules of this 
framework should be effectively enforced.
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Appendices
Appendix 2.A
Chronology of monetary measures and financial deregulations, 1970-93
1970 Bank Indones ia  (B l) issued SB Is as th e ir own liab ility
1971 - SB Is d iscon tinued
- R up iah  pegged to $US
- No fo re ign  exchange  con tro ls
- O pen cap ita l accoun t
- No new  en try  and new  ope ra tions  of banks and N BFIs
1974 - Bl o rgan ised  an in te rbank ca ll m oney m arket, inc lud ing  a local 
c lea ring  system
- c red it ce ilings im posed  on all d om es tic  banks excep t fo r 
cred its  extended  in ce rta in  p rio rity  sec to rs  w hich  con tinued  to 
rece ive  subs id ised  liqu id ity  c red its  from  Bl
N ovem ber 78 - D eva lua tion  of R upiah (50% )
- R up iah  w as pegged  to baske t of cu rren c ies  of Indonesia 's  
m ain trad ing  partners
- A  m anaged  floa t system  in troduced , the  nom ina l exchange
rate w as to be deva lued  on a regu la r bas is  by sm all am ounts , and 
averaged  about 3%  per annum
1979 Bl in troduced  fo re ign  exchange  sw ap fa c ility  —  "sw aps"—
O cto b e r 82 Bl takes  2%  m argin  fo r sw aps
Februa ry  83 Bl reduced  sw ap m arg in  to 0 .25%
1983 S evere  p ressure  on Rupiah
M arch 83 - 39%  deva lua tion  of Rupiah
June  83 F inancia l D eregu la tion  P ackage :
- E lim ina tion  of c red it ce iling
- E lim ina tion  of all ce ilings on d ep os it rates of in te rest and m ost loan 
rates of in te rest
- Bl liqu id ity  cred its  s ign ifican tly  reduced  by te rm ina ting  
a num be r of the high p rio rity  c red it schem es
Februa ry  84 Bl re issued  SB Is once a w eek  w ith  3 0 -  and 9 0 -  day m atu rity
S e p tem be r 84 SBI issued  da ily  and m ade e lig ib le  fo r red iscoun t by Bl
O c to b e r 84 SB Is w ith  1 5 -d a y  m atu rity  issued
F ebrua ry  85 - SB PU  in troduced  w ith  3 0 -  to 9 0 -  day  m atu rity
- F ico rinvest, an NBFI and Bl a ffilia te , nam ed as m arket m aker 
fo r SB PU
M ay 85 15-day m atu rity  SBI d iscon tinued
Ju ly  85 SB Is began  to be auctioned  da ily
A ugus t 85 - In te rbank loan lim its ra ised to 15%  fo r R up iah  funds from  th ird  
parties
- SB PU  m atu rity  ra ised to 180 days
- SBI issued  cou ld  be red iscoun ted  at F ico rinves t o r Bl w ithou t 
pena lty
A ugust 86 SBI issued  on w eek ly  basis on ly
S e p tem be r 86 A m a jo r deva lua tion  of R upiah (50% )
O cto b e r 86 - Banks ' m in im um  sw aps p rem ium  ra ised  to 8%
- R em ova l of ce iling  on sw aps
D e c .1986 - J a n .1987 S evere  p ressure  on R upiah
M ay - Ju ly  1987 - Banks' m in im um  sw aps p rem ium  ra ised to 9%
- SBI o ffe r rate increased
- Bl d iscoun t rate raised to 19%
- Banks required  to repurchase  large  portions of ow n S B P U s 
be fo re  m atu rity
- Basic d iscoun t rate increased to 30%
- Bank depos its  of m a jor sta te  en te rp rises  (B U M N ) trans fo rm ed  
into SBI ho ld ings
- Fore igne rs  a llow ed  to invest in dom estic  portfo lios
O ctobe r 88 F inancia l de regu la tion  package (P A K TO  27,88)
- Freed up entry  and ope ra tions of banks and N BFIs
ie, a ll lim its on dom estic  bank b ranch ing  rem oved; fo re ign  
banks perm itted  to fo rm  jo in t ven tu re  w ith  loca l pa rtne rs  
(85%  m axim um  fo re ign  partne r w ith  a m in im um  paid  up cap ita l 
requ irem en t of $30 m illion); fo re ign  banks a lready  p resen t in 
Ja ka rta  a llow ed  to branch out to six m a jo r p rov inc ia l c ities
- Low er reserve  requ irem en ts  (from  15%  to 2% ), how ever, banks 
had to buy SB Is w ith  3 -6  m onth m atu rity  up to 80%  of the
increased
funds
- S w ap tied  to fo rm u la  and m atu rity  leng thened  to  3 years
- T w o -d a y  se ttlem en t fo r fo re ign  exchange  tran sac tio n s
- S ta te  e n te rp rises  a llow ed to put 50%  of depos its  ou ts ide  the  sta te  
banks
- M axim um  legal lend ing  lim its im posed  on banks and N BFIs 
(as a %  of lender's  cap ita l); 20%  to a s ing le  borrow er, and 50%  
to a g roup  of borrow ers
M arch 89 F inancia l de regu la tion  package (P A K M A R  89)
- C e ilings on fo re ign  borrow ings by banks w ith  fo re ign  exchange  
lisences lifted
- Net open fo re ign  exchange  position  (ove rn igh t fo re ign  exchange  
pos ition ) lim its p laced on banks equa l to 25%  of th e ir cap ita l
January  90 F inancia l de regu la tion  package (PAK JAN  90)
- A bo lition  of Bl subs id ised  re financing  fac ilitie s  (liqu id ity  cred its ) 
w h ich  gave c red its  at (be low  m arket) in te rest rates from  3%
to 14.5%  to banks w hich  then lent to p rio rity  sec to rs  at be low  m ar­
ket in te rest rates excep t f o r : ce rta in  food  stocks, inve s tm en t c re ­
dit fo r d eve lopm en t banks, N BFIs and esta tes, w o rk ing  c red its  
fo r fa rm ers , and certa in  cred its  fo r coopera tives . H ow ever, in te ­
rest rates on these  cred its  w ere  increased  at least to  n ea r-m a r­
ket leve ls
- N ationa l banks required  w ith in  one ye a r to a lloca te  a m in i­
m um  of 20%  of loan portfo lio  to sm all bus iness, de fined  as 
having  assets  of less than Rp 600 m illion, exc lud ing  land and 
each loan not exceed ing  Rp 200 m illion. Fa ilure  to do th is  a llo ­
ca tion  w ou ld  a ffec t "soundness of the  bank"
- Fore ign  /jo in t-v e n tu re  banks required  to extend  50%  of 
th e ir c red its  to  e xp o rt-o rie n te d  industries
Februa ry  90 S tate  e n te rp rises  required  to conve rt th e ir depos its  w ith  
d om estic  banks into SBI hold ings.
February  91 P o licy package  on bank superv is ion
- C ap ita l a dequacy  based on the s tandard  se t by BIS, w ith  a 
m in im um  am oun t of 8%  of the  risk -w e igh ted  asse ts  and can be 
done  in s teps: 5%  at the  end of M arch 1992; 7%  at the  end of
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March 1993; 8% at the end of December 1993
- Liquidity credits subject to limits except for farm enterpri­
ses (KUT), credit to cooperatives, and to the State Logistic 
Agency (BULOG)
- Net open position for all currencies at the maximum 20% of
the capital, the maximum amount for each currency set at 25% of 
the capital
- Maximum bank swap to Bank Indonesia 20% of the capital 
(from 25%), maturity of reswap longer than 1 month and up to 
3 years
- State enterprises and agencies' deposits with domestic banks 
converted into special SBI at the rate of 22 per cent
- Regulations on opening new bank branches__________________
October 91 Imposition of ceilings on offshore borrowing by banks
October 92 Financial deregulation package (PAKTO 30,92)
- New banks paid-up capital increased from Rp10 billion to 
Rp50 billion for national commercial banks and from Rp50 billion 
to Rp 100 billion for foreign/joint-venture banks.
- Rural banks (BPR) allowed to open branches in cities and local 
districts (Kabupaten) previously prohibited.
- National commercial banks, state-owned banks, and rural banks 
allowed to merger if assets which resulted from merger not more 
than 20% of commercial banks' asset.
- Foreign investors allowed to hold up to 49% of the shares of 
Indonesian banks
- New rules for insurance companies; penalty for late financial 
reports
May 93 Financial deregulation package (PAKMEI 93):
- Legal lending limit to a group of borrowers was reduced to 
20 per cent of lender's capital
- Banks that cannot meet their allocations of credits to small 
firms allowed to buy other banks small loans promissory notes
-New regulations on items of capital for capital adequacy ratio
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Annual Report, various issues, Jakarta.
Cole, D.C. and Slade, B.F., 1990b. 'Development of money market in Indonesia', the Harvard 
Law School and Harvard Institute of International Development, mimeo, Boston, M.A.
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Appendix 2.B
Macroeconomic adjustment policies 1983-93
Policies 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Exchange —-
rate  1 2345
Others 5
1 Rupiah devalued; nominal exchange rate depreciated against US$.
2 Large projects rephased; government spending reduced; tax reforms initiated.
3 Interest & credit ceilings removed; new financial measures introduced; barriers to 
market entry removed; bank supervision; tight money policy.
4 Nominal tariffs reduced; import licensing restrictions reduced; non-tariff barriers 
greatly reduced.
5 Ports reorganised; foreign investment regulations relaxed; pharmaceutical & 
agricultural sectors deregulated.
Exchange rate policies. After removing foreign exchange controls in 1971, 
the rupiah was pegged to the US dollar until 1978. The much higher domestic 
inflation than that of the US, overvalued the rupiah and hence lowered 
competitiveness in international markets. The rupiah was then devalued by 50 per 
cent in November 1978 and a more flexible exchange rate system was adopted. The 
currency was depreciated at a steady rate (about 3 per cent per annum) against the 
dollar. In 1982 world petroleum prices dropped significantly and Indonesia faced 
balance of payments difficulties. The rupiah was again devalued by 39 per cent in 
March 1983 to stimulate non oil exports. The current account deficit dropped from 
US$6.3 billion in 1983 to US$1.8 billion in 1984. As petroleum prices continued to 
fall, the current account deficit widened to nearly US$ 4 billion in 1986. Another 
significant devaluation (50 per cent) of the rupiah took place in September 1986. 
Supportive monetary and fiscal policies adopted following the devaluation made the 
real effective exchange rate depreciat by almost the same percentage. As a result, the
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current account deficit was reduced to US$ 2 billion in the following year and 
continued to decline until 1989, before climbing up again from 1990 due to the rapid 
increase in foreign borrowing.
Those three successive devaluations left the market vulnerable to currency 
speculation based on rumors or expectations of impending devaluations. Three heavy 
speculative attacks on the rupiah took place in 1984, 1987, and 1991. In response to 
the rapid build up of Indonesia's international reserves since 1992, the rupiah was 
allowed to appreciate modestly against the dollar during the last quarter of 1993, 
before beginning to depreciate again around the end of the year. This indication of the 
willingness of the authorities to exercise greater exchange rate flexibility may well 
have led to the emergence of a deeper foreign exchange market than has previously 
existed.
Fiscal policies. Since 1983 the government has been tightening its fiscal 
budget and improving tax structure. A major drop in petroleum prices motivated the 
government to rephase large capital and import-intensive projects in May 1983. To 
further reduce government expenditure, a major cutback in government real capital 
spending was initiated, followed by restraints on civil service employment and 
salaries. The government also tightly controlled the use of non-concessional 
import-related credits. From the revenue side, and also to reduce private spending, 
tax reforms were taken starting in January 1983. The reforms have included 
improving the tax structure and administration of all tax sources, and excluding taxes 
on foreign trade.
Trade policies. Prior to the 1980s Indonesia's trade regime was distorted, 
especially through import licensing. Besides misallocated resources, this created 
differences in incentives between importables and exportables production, between 
sales to domestic and export markets, and between tradeables and nontradeables. In 
the absence of a competent bureaucracy, this also created rent-seeking activities 
benefiting non exporters (Sjahrir and Pangestu 1992). Trade deregulation efforts 
undertaken since April 1985, therefore, have been primarily aimed at reducing (or
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unifying) the incentives differences, eliminating rent-seeking activities, and improving 
resource allocation efficiency.
To reduce tariffs, an across-the-board reduction in nominal tariffs was 
implemented in 1985, 1986, and 1990. Further tariff reductions, mainly on 
manufactured goods, were taken in June 1993. This included reductions on 221 
tariffs and 76 import surcharges. It was hoped that this would provide 
encouragement for non oil exports, both by reducing the cost of imported inputs, and 
through the exchange rate impact of stimulating the flow of imports. In this package 
it also contained measures to cut back the high level of protection on the automotive 
industry. But it appears that the level of protection was actually increased rather than 
decreased. Reductions on tariffs continued at the beginning of 1994, covering some 
1,941 products imported from members of ASEAN under the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff Scheme. Several other "politically sensitive" commodities such as 
plastics, steel, and soybean meal, however, remain highly protected.
From May 1986 to July 1992, a series of significant measures to reduce 
import licensing restrictions and promote exports were introduced. For example, 
measures to provide internationally-priced inputs to exporters. This scheme permits 
exporters and suppliers of inputs for exporters to bypass the import licensing system 
and to reclaim import duties, although the cost imposed by non-tariff barriers cannot 
be rebated. Significant reductions in import licensing restrictions was undertaken 
through a series of measures in October 1986, January and December 1987, 
November 1988, May 1990, and July 1992. This was combined with steps taken in 
December 1987 to reduce the anti-export bias of trade policy by reducing regulatory 
restrictions for exporters. To further reduce the high costs of the economy, major 
steps to remove and replace non-tariff barriers were initiated together with general 
reductions of tariff rates in May 1990 and July 1992.
Other economic policies. To increase efficiency, improve competition in the 
international market, and promote foreign investment, the above adjustment policies 
were accompanied by additional policies in different sectors of the economy. In April 
1985 the government reorganised customs, ports and shipping operations to reduce
freight costs and cut processing time. This was followed by steps taken through the 
May 1986, October 1986, January 1987, and December 1987 packages to reduce 
investment and capacity requirements, relax foreign investment regulations, and 
reduce the role of the local content activities. A substantial deregulation of maritime 
activities was also announced in November 1988 in order to reduce costs and 
encourage private sector participation. In line with encouragement of investment, a 
restrictive positive list of areas open for investment was replaced with a short 
negative list. Some initial steps towards public enterprise reform were also 
undertaken. Deregulation was extended to pharmaceutical activities in the May 1990 
package.
In the agricultural sector, several important regulatory changes were also 
taken from 1988 to 1991. The changes were intended to reduce rice production 
subsidies and controls on the importation of crop commodities that have been 
designed to achieve self-sufficiency and to protect domestic agricultural producers. 
The general moves to reduce and discontinue of subsidisation, and protect of the 
agricultural sector were perhaps motivated by the increasing capacity of 
manufacturing to absorb labour. The 1988 deregulation covers the elimination and 
replacement with tariffs of non-tariff barriers on a wide range of food items and the 
exemption from the 30 per cent duty on vegetable oils for the largest refiner and 
importer. Bulog's (the logistics board) appointment as the sole importer of maize was 
revoked in 1989.
In 1991, another important package was introduced. It consisted of 
deregulation on imports of fresh and frozen poultry, other fresh and preserved meats, 
fruits and nuts (with tariffs ranging from 10 to 20 per cent). The package also 
included: reduction in tariffs for palm and coconut oil from 30 to 10 per cent and for 
copra and palm kernel oil from 30 to 5 per cent; removal of the ban on soy meal 
imports and replacement with a 5 per cent tariff and 35 per cent surcharges; and 
elimination of licensing restrictions on tin-plate (a major input in the canning 
industry) and replacement with a 22.5 per cent duty.
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The deregulation, however, was also combined with new domestic trade 
restrictions for some commodities. For example a consortium of clove traders was 
given the monopoly right to serve as middlemen between growers and cigarette 
manufacturers in return for operating a floor price system for producers. Similar 
monopoly right was also given for citrus fruit production and marketing. Other 
measures were announced in July 1992 to allow joint venture firms to hold land titles 
(right to use the land) and use them for credit collateral. The measures also included 
liberalisation of imports of used machinery, plant equipment and other capital goods, 
and liberalisation of expatriate work permits.
In response to the sharp decline in foreign investment through the beginning 
of 1993, the government introduced a new policy package intended to encourage a 
higher level of foreign investment, in October 1993. The time scale of divestment was 
lengthened considerably and can now be achieved by way of public flotation of 
foreign companies' shares, thus removing the need to find a suitable domestic partner. 
Small, fully foreign owned companies with capital as little as US$ 2 million may now 
be established, provided their output is in the form of inputs for other industries. 
Foreign companies operating in industrial and bounded zones will be permitted to sell 
goods on the domestic market up to a value of 25 per cent of the value of goods they 
export.
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Appendix 2.C
Table 1 Main economic indicators
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
G D P (US$ b n ) 78 87.3 106.1 116.6 128.3 142.7
G ro w th  (%) 9.8 2.6 7.2 6.9 6.4 6.7
P o p u la t io n  (million) 140 164.6 182.7 186.1 189.5 192.9
G ro w th  (% p .a .) 2.1 2.3 2 1.9 1.8 1.8
G N P p e r  c a p i t a  (US$) 470 520 552 593 634 693
S h a re  in G D P (%)
A g ricu ltu re 24.8 23.2 21.5 19.6 19.2 18.4
Industry 34.4 35.8 39.4 41.4 40.5 39.1
M a n u fa c tu r in g 11.6 16 19.9 20.9 21.7 22.4
M ining a n d  q u a r ry in g 25.7 14 13.4 13.8 11.9 8.9
S erv ices 31.8 40.9 39.1 39 40.3 42.6
S h a re  in G D P (%)
G ross d o m e s t ic  in v e s tm e n t 20.9 23.1 28.4 28.2 26.9
G ross d o m e s t ic  s a v in g 37.2 29.8 37.3 35.5 37.7 38
G o v e rn m e n t  e x p e n d i tu r e 25.8 23.5 25.3 22.9 22.3 20.9
G o v e r n m e n t  surp lus -2.3 -3.7 -5 -4.6 -4.2 -3.2
Infla tion  (% p .a .  CPI) 18.5 4.7 9.9 9.9 5 10.2
Sources: Asia Pacific Economics Group, Asia Pacific Profiles, Australian National University, 
Canberra, various issues; Bank Indonesia, Annual Report, Jakarta, various issues.
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Table 2 External economic indicators
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
M e r c h a n d i s e  e x p o r t s  (U S S bn) 21 .9 18.6 26 .8 29 .6 33 .8 33 .4
% c h a n g e 23.8 -6.5 16.7 10.5 14 -1 .2
% G D P 28.1 21 .3 25 .3 2 5 .4 26 .3 23 .4
M e r c h a n d i s e  im p o r ts  (U S S bn) 14.1 12.6 2 4 .5 24 .8 26 .8 28
% c h a n g e 32.7 -10 .6 50 .3 1.2 8.1 4 .5
M e r c h a n d i s e  t r a d e  b a l a n c e 7.8 6.1 2.3 4 .8 7 5 .4
(U S S bn)
N e t  inv isib les (U S S bn) -6.5 -7 .9 -8 .6 -9 .2 -10.1 -10 .7
C u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  (U S S b n ) 1.3 -1 .8 -6 .2 -4 .4 -3.1 -5 .3
% G D P 1.7 -2.1 -5 .9 -3 .8 -2 .4 -3 .7
T erm s o f  t r a d e  (1 9 8 5 =  100) 87.3 100 76 .5 70 .3 70 .2
E x p o rt p r i c e  in d e x  (1 9 8 5 = 1 0 0 ) 63.1 100 163 157.3 162.8
Im p o r t  p r i c e  in d e x  (1 9 8 5 = 1 0 0 ) 72.3 100 2 1 2 .9 2 23 .7 232
F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e  r e s e r v e s  (U S S bn) 6 .5 5 .8 8.7 9 .9 11.6 12.3
E x c h a n g e  r a t e  (R p /U S $ ) 627 1111 1843 1950 2 0 3 0 2081
R e a l e x c h a n g e  r a t e  a g a i n s t
m a jo r  in d u s tr ia l  e c o n o m i e s
(1 9 8 5 = 1 0 0 ) 86 100 183 188 193 177
E x te rn a l lo n g - te r m  d e b t  (U S S bn) 18.1 30 .7 54 6 3 .5 72 .3 75 .5
% G D P 25 35 .2 5 0 .9 5 4 .5 5 6 .4 52 .9
E x te rn a l lo n g - te r m  d e b t  s e r v ic e
ra t io  (% e x p o r ts ) 12.7 24 .9 2 4 .9 2 3 .5 26 .7 24 .5
Sources: Asia Pacific Economics Group, Asia Pacific Profiles, Australian National University, 
Canberra, various issues; Bank Indonesia, Annual Report, Jakarta, various issues.
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Table 3 Trade by destination and source (% share)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
E x p o rts
D e s t in a t io n  (% s h a r e )  
ASEAN 12.6 10.6 9 .8 11 11.6 12.8
C h in e s e  e c o n o m i e s 2.3 4 .3 8 .9 10.1 11.6 9 .3
K o re a 1.3 3 .5 5 .3 6 .7 4.1 7 .9
J a p a n 49.1 46 42 .5 36 .9 3 4 .2 31 .6
A u s tra lia  a n d  N e w  Z e a la n d 2 1.2 1.9 2 .2 2 .6 2 .4
EEC 6.5 6 .2 11.8 12.8 13.8 13.7
U n ite d  S ta te s 19.6 21 .6 13.1 12 13.7 14
R e s t o f  t h e  w o rld 6 .5 6 .7 6.7 8 .2 8 .6 8.3
Im p o r ts
S o u r c e  (% s h a r e )  
ASEAN 12.4 9 .4 8 .2 9 .5 10.2 12.4
C h in e s e  e c o n o m i e s 7.1 5.7 10.3 9 .2 9 .2 17.7
K o re a 2.2 2 4 .5 5 .6 7.7 7 .9
J a p a n 31 .3 25 .7 24 .8 24 .5 22 .3 10.2
A u s tra lia  a n d  N e w  Z e a la n d 4 .2 5 .2 6 5 .8 5 .5 5
EEC 13.5 17.5 18.8 18.2 20 .2 18
U n ite d  S ta te s 12.9 16.7 11.5 13.1 11.1 9 .2
R e s t o f  t h e  w o rld 16.5 17.7 15.9 14.1 13.5 17.7
Sources: Asia Pacific Economics Group, Asia Pacific Profiles, Australian National University, 
Canberra, various issues; Bank Indonesia, Annual Report, Jakarta, various issues.
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Table 4 Trade by principal commodities (US$m)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total m e rc h a n d is e  exports 21908 18587 25675 29142 33967 36264
Oil a n d  n a tu ra l g a s 12858 12339 11071 10895 10671 9911
% m e rc h a n d is e  exports 58.7 66.3 43.1 37.4 31.4 27.3
% a n n u a l  g ro w th 44.8 2 27.6 -1.6 -2.1 -7.1
A griculture 4773 2963 3700 4214 4445 4730
% m e rc h a n d is e  exports 21.8 16 14 14 13 13
% a n n u a l  g ro w th -3.2 1 14 5 6
M ining a n d  m inerals 3744 830 1410 1642 2190 1998
% m e rc h a n d is e  exports 17.1 4.5 5.5 5.6 6.4 5.5
% a n n u a l  g ro w th -0.9 -19.8 16.5 33.4 -8.8
W o o d  a n d  w o o d  p ro d u c ts 68 942 3630 4060 4691 6113
% m e rc h a n d is e  exports 0.3 5 14.1 13.9 13.8 16.9
% a n n u a l  g ro w th 36.3 0.4 11.8 15.5 30.3
M a n u fa c tu r in g 465 1513 5864 8331 11970 13511
% m e rc h a n d is e  exports 2.1 8.2 22.8 28.6 35.2 37
% a n n u a l  g ro w th 9.5 32.1 42.1 43.7 12.9
Total m e rc h a n d is e  im ports 9674 9103 21931 26114 27301 27612
C ru d e  oil a n d  oil p ro d u c ts 1744 1273 1735 2299 2025 1961
% m e rc h a n d is e  im ports 18 14.1 7.9 8.8 7.4 7.1
% a n n u a l  g ro w th -15.3 47 32.5 -11.9 -3.2
C o n su m e r g o o d s 2035 1338 1733 2035 2384 2457
% m e rc h a n d is e  im ports 21 14.9 7.9 7.8 8.7 8.9
% a n n u a l  g ro w th 17.4 17.1 3.1
In te rm e d ia te  g o o d s 2651 2823 8277 8963 9818 10167
% m e rc h a n d is e  im ports 27.5 31 37.7 34.3 36 36.8
% a n n u a l  g ro w th •• 8.3 9.5 3.6
C a p ita l  g o o d s 3244 3639 10186 12817 13075 13037
% m e rc h a n d is e  im ports 33.5 40 46.4 49.1 47.9 47.2
% a n n u a l  g ro w th . . 25.8 2 -0.3
Sources: Asia Pacific Economics Group, Asia Pacific Profiles, Australian National University, 
Canberra, various issues; Bank Indonesia, Annual Report, Jakarta, various issues.
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Appendix 4. A
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model
Assume each project has a distribution of gross return F(/?,0), where R is the gross 
return on a project, incorporating the mean and the variance and 0 is a measure of 
the riskiness (i.e. the variance) of the project. An individual borrows the amount of L 
at interest rate r. The individual defaults if the return R plus the collateral C is 
insufficient to pay back the loan (L), i.e. if
C + R < L (1+r) (1)
The net return to the borrower IT, (/?,r) can be written as
n,(/?,r) = max (R - L(\+r)\ - Q  (2)
The return to the bank Yl2(R,r), that is the loan plus interest or the maximum possible 
R+C, or
Id2 (R,r) = min (R + C; L( 1 +r)) (3)
Borrower and lender are risk neutral, i.e. the net return to the borrower and 
the return to the bank can be written as functions of the project return R. From (2), 
the net return to the borrower is a convex function of R and hence expected return 
increases with risk. Stiglitz and Weiss maintain that the interest rate can be used as a 
screening device. For a given interest rate r, there is a critical value 0 such that a firm
115
borrows from the bank if and only if 9>0 The value of 0 for which expected net 
return are zero satisfies:
n , (r ,0 ) = Jm ax [ R -  L{ 1 + r ) ;-C ]3 F (R,Q) = 0 (4)
o
An increase in interest rate induces an adverse selection effect through the worsening 
of the mix of applicants, i.e. differentiating (4) over r
30
dr
B \dF(R,Q)
L(\+ r )—C
an, / ae (5)
that is the critical value of 9 increases as the interest rate increases.
In the presence of moral hazard problems in banking, Equation (3) would become:
n  2 (R,r) = min ( L( 1 +r)) (6)
Appendix 5.A
The 'actuarially fair' premium
Assume that a bank that is assumed to be risk averse lends an amount of loan L at 
interest rate r.1 The bank's gross return from the loan is subject to some uncertainty 
regarding the risks involve in credit markets which lead to a default on the loan. Let p 
be the probability of a default, and 1-p be the probability of no default. If there is no
'One might worry about what would happen if the bank was risk neutral and the contract was 
actuarially unfair? In this case, it is possible that the first-order condition and the problem do not 
have a solution. For the sake of simplicity and for the later discussion and analysis, we will limit 
ourselves to assume that the bank is risk averse. For detailed discussion on this matter, see Kreps 
( 1990).
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default the bank would receive a gross return from the loan 71 = L( 1+r). If there is a 
default, the gross return would be n ' , i.e. in an extreme case n'  could equal zero. 
The central bank is willing to insure against the loss or the default loan D = k - k '  . If 
the bank pays a premium of 5 , the central bank will be prepared to pay D back if the 
bank sustains this loss. The bank may buy a partial coverage ab and it will get back 
aD if it sustains the loss.
The bank is assumed to have a (indirect) utility function v, which is strictly 
increasing, concave, and differentiable. The bank's problem concerning how much 
insurance to buy can be written
M ax( l -p )v (n  -ab ) + pv(n '+aD-ab ) (1)
a
The first-order condition of this problem is
(l-p)b v '(k  -ab ) = p(D-b ) v '(k  -(l-a)D-ab ) (2)
as k ' = K -D a n d n  '+aD = k -(l-a)D
Since the (direct) utility function u is concave and a is unconstrained, the first-order 
condition is necessary and sufficient for a solution.
The insurance contract is said to be 'actuarially fair' if the expected payout 
equals the premium, that is if pD = S . This equality can be rewritten as ( l-p)b = 
p(D-b ). Hence, if the contract is 'actuarially fair', the first-order condition becomes
v'(n -ab ) = v'(n -(l-a)D-ab ) (3)
or when a=l,  and the bank will purchase full insurance and pay a premium of S . 
The central bank is thus prepared to pay the amount of the default loan back to the 
bank if the bank sustains the default.
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